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I. INTRODUCrION
One of the most difficult problems in the study of international
law is determining when a rule of law applies to a given situation.
This problem has two dimensions: (1) determining what the rule of
law is and (2) determining when and how it is applied. The first di-
mension, though complex, is the subject of Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice,' and the starting point for most dis-
cussions of international law.2 Though it may be difficult to establish
the existence of a rule of international law, particularly in the absence
of a treaty, the process of demonstrating customary international law
is one with which international lawyers are familiar.
The application of international law is perhaps the more difficult
issue. Traditional jurisprudential theory is based on political concepts
of sovereignty.3 The state, as sovereign, both creates and enforces
law. In the international arena, each state is sovereign within its own
territory and equal to all other states in international matters. There
is no supreme executive to administer and enforce international law,
even when states agree on the rule of law. Thus, while the interna-
tional community may be able to carry out the legislative function in
the creation of rules of conduct (through either treaty law or the es-
tablishment of customary international law), it has not yet provided an
effective framework for the judicial and executive functions of appli-
cation and enforcement.
Despite this problem, the latter half of the twentieth century has
seen unprecedented development of international economic law, gov-
erning the extent to which states may place restrictions on transac-
tions involving goods, services, capital and persons crossing their
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38,59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993.
2 See, e.g., RESrATEmENT (TmaRD) OF T=E FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
3 Modern international law is generally considered to trace its roots to the work of Hugo
Grotius, first published in 1625, which focused on relationships between nations. HUGO GRO-
TIUS, THE RioGHs OF WAR AND PEACE (De Jure Belli ac Pads) (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901).
See also Louis HENKiN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PoLncs AND VALUES 1 (1995) ("International
law is the law of the international system of nation states."); JAmES BRmRLY, THm LAw OF
NATIONS 1-40 (6th ed. 1963).
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borders. The European Community (EC) is the best example of a
source of regional, supranational rules that have the force and effect
of law in each of the Member States.4 Through the concept of "direct
effect," developed in the Treaty of Rome and through the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Justice, European Community legis-
lation can be asserted in national courts as the source of rights running
to private parties even against their own governments.5 Thus, there is
a method for both the creation and application of European Commu-
nity law.
More problematic is whether rules similar to those in the Euro-
pean Community, but developed on a global scale, have equivalent
effect in national courts. Most recently, the 1994 agreements signed in
Marrakech substantially expanded, supplemented and strengthened
the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or
General Agreement) and created the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to administer those rules.6 Despite the inclusion of a strength-
ened dispute resolution mechanism,7 the extent to which the rules
contained in the Marrakech agreements can be applied by national
courts especially within the member states of the WTO is not entirely
clear.
The rules governing state regulation of international economic
transactions are based largely on the economic theory of comparative
advantage.8 Thus, they assume the benefits of open trade regimes,
whether on a national, regional or global scale. Applying comparative
advantage theory, it is easy to decide that states should not restrict
trade at their borders, whether it be through import or export tariffs,
4 It is the European Community, not the European Union, which has legal personality and
the power to enter into relationships with third countries. Thus, throughout this article, most
references will be to the Community, which is one of the three "pillars" of the European Union.
See generally TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 177, O.J.
(C224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
5 See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text. The European Economic Community was
established by the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957,298 U.N.T.S. 3,19 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. The EEC TREATY was amended by the EC
TREATY, supra note 4.
6 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF TE URUGUAY ROUND V01. 1 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Final Act].
7 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESuLTs OF Tm URUGUAY ROUND,
33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
8 For a more detailed discussion of the economic theory underlying international trade law
see Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of
Private International Law, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jagdeep
Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., forthcoming)(copy on file with author).
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quotas, or other measures of trade inhibition. European Community
rules prohibiting internal tariffs, quotas or discriminatory taxes, and
limiting state aid to economic enterprises, are supported by this
theory. Commentators generally agree that all Member States have
benefited from the single market which prohibits (or at least limits)
restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, capital and per-
sons. The European Court of Justice is available to interpret Commu-
nity legislation to help insure the availability of these benefits.'
On a global scale, the WTO administers the rules prohibiting gov-
ernmental restraints on trade. There is, however, no single court to
apply these rules to every claim of violation or inconsistency. While
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding) is available to
apply the rules in disputes between states,10 states have not demon-
strated the willingness to give to the WTO the kind of authority Euro-
pean Member States have relinquished to the European Court of
Justice.
This creates problems for international lawyers who view the
rules of the multilateral system as law applicable to the Member
States of the WTO. In the United States, the GATT has at times been
reviewed in the courts to determine whether it is "self-executing" (the
U.S. concept equivalent to the EC's "direct effect")." While judicial
decisions provide no clear position on this question, Congress made
clear in the legislation implementing the Marrakech agreements that
those agreements do not provide rules enforceable in U.S. courts by
private parties.'2 Thus, the question is decided by statute in the
United States, with the rules of the GATT having less than full legal
effect.
Despite statutory limitations on the application of WTO agree-
ments in U.S. courts, case law in both the United States and the Euro-
pean Community recognizes that international agreements may confer
upon individuals rights which can be invoked in the courts. 3 In both
jurisdictions, however, limitations are placed on the derivation of such
rights from international agreements. Whether the question is one of
"direct effect" in the European Community or of "self-execution" in
the United States, the issue is whether a treaty provides legal rules
9 See EC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 177.
10 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 7.
11 See infra notes 36-64 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 16-29, 80-228 and accompanying text.
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capable of enforcement through litigation when private parties con-
tend their rights have been affected, or simply provides rules applica-
ble to sovereign relations.
This article reviews the doctrines of self-execution in U.S. law and
direct effect in EC law, as they have been applied to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It then addresses whether the prac-
tice in each of the United States and the European Community is con-
sistent with the development of the more complete framework of
international economic law provided by the Uruguay Round agree-
ments, and suggests the need for reconsideration of the politically
rational but legally troublesome doctrine of direct effect. 4
II. THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF SELF-ExEcuTION' 5
A. The Doctrine Generally Stated
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 6 This provision places
treaties on the same level as statutes in the U.S. legal order. The coe-
qual status of statutes and treaties required that a rule be developed
early in U.S. history for the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute.17 Such conflicts are resolved by the rule, lex posterior derogat
priori (the later-in-time prevails), which was enunciated by the
Supreme Court as follows:
But even [though a treaty is the law of the land as an act of Congress is]
• * there is nothing in [a treaty] which makes it irrepealable or un-
changeable. The Constitution gives it no superiority over an act of Con-
gress in this respect, which may be repealed or modified by an act of a
later date .....
In short, we are of the opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial
cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Con-
gress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.
18
14 General Agreement on Tariffs afid Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, as amended by the Uruguay Round Final Act, supra note 6 [hereinafter GAIT].
15 Portions of this section are developed from the author's earlier work: Ronald A. Brand,
The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26
STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990).
16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
17 Both treaties and statutes are considered subsidiary to the Constitution itself, and must
give way if found to conflict with constitutional principles.
18 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,598-99 (1884). See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190 (1888); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
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Where there is no later act of Congress in conflict with a treaty provi-
sion, this lex posterior rule is inapplicable, and the treaty itself pro-
vides the source of law. However, the absence of conflicting
legislation does not guarantee that a treaty rule will be determinative
in a dispute in a U.S. court. The application of treaty rules is further
circumscribed by the doctrine of self-execution. This doctrine limits
the role of treaty rules by providing that, in the absence of implement-
ing legislation, treaty law will be applicable to disputes in U.S. courts
only if the provision addressed is "self-executing."' 19
A treaty is self-executing when it "operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision,"20 and "whenever its provisions pre-
scribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may
be determined."'" Such treaties may not deal with matters which have
been expressly and exclusively delegated to Congress,22 and treaties
calling for the expenditure of funds are non-self-executing inasmuch
as they are ineffective without the implementing legislation providing
the necessary appropriation. 23
To the extent concepts of "dualism" and "monism" may be useful
in explaining the manner in which a legal system takes account of in-
19 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 111.
20 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
21 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99. Commentators have dissected this language in a
manner that leaves some with the conclusion that self-executing status is "distinct from whether
the treaty creates private rights or remedies." RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 111 cmt. h. Some
have separated the question of whether a treaty requires implementing legislation from the ques-
tion of whether a treaty "aims at the immediate creation of rights and duties of private individu-
als which are enforceable," while finding that both questions are part of the "concept of self-
executing treaties." Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v.
Postal: Win At Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-97 (1980). A treaty may create private
rights and remedies with an accompanying procedural mechanism of its own for application of
those rights and remedies. However, to the extent it does not do so, the question of whether it
provides substantive rules creating rights or remedies is generally considered under the rubric of
self-execution in U.S. courts.
22 See, e.g., Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 280
U.S. 571 (1929)(finding that the article I, § 8, cl. 7 delegation of authority to Congress prevented
a self-executing treaty on patents). It has more recently been determined that some patent trea-
ties are self-executing. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir.
1956).
23 Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344 (D. Mich. 1852) (No.
14,251). A list of examples of such treaties is found in The Over the Top, Schroeder v. Bissell, 5
F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925). The Restatement states that a treaty will be considered non-self-
executing if (a) it "manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law
without the enactment of implementing legislation," (b) the Senate, in consenting to the treaty
(or Congress in a resolution), requires implementing legislation, or (c) implementing legislation
is constitutionally required. RESrATMErNT, supra note 2, § 111(4).
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ternational law,24 the doctrine of self-execution reflects "the United
States' adoption of a partly 'dualist' - rather than a strictly 'monist' -
view of international and domestic law."5 A treaty that is not self-
executing,
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor
of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction
becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations...
[but] with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no
redress.26
Just as notions of "dualism" and "monism" cannot fully explain the
doctrine of self-execution in U.S. law; however, a treaty is not likely to
be reviewed by a court to determine if it is self-executing as a whole.
U.S. courts generally confine their analysis to specific provisions of a
treaty in determining self-executing status.2 7 A relevant treaty provi-
sion is analyzed to determine "the intent of the signatory parties as
manifested by the language of the instrument. '28 Courts look to the
language of a provision to determine whether it is "addressed to the
judicial branch of our government," and confers rights upon individ-
ual citizens, or merely "calls upon governments to take certain
actions. 29
B. The Self-Execution Doctrine and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade never received the
consent of the Senate referred to in Article II, Section 2, of the U.S.
Constitution.3" The GATT originally was designed to operate only
provisionally until the establishment of more comprehensive institu-
tional arrangements under the Charter of the International Trade Or-
24 "[D]ualists view international law as a discrete legal system [which] ... operates wholly on
an inter-nation plane." Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Cen-
tury of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987). Conversely,
"monists" view international law as an integral part of the legal system, often prevailing over all
inconsistent statutes. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82
MIcH. L. REv. 1555, 1564-65 n.34 (1984).
25 Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
26 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
27 See, e.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,937 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (finding Article 94 of the U.N. Charter not to be self-executing). For a discussion of ear-
lier cases applying the doctrine of self-execution to articles of the U.N. Charter see Ronald A.
Brand, Security Council Resolutions: When Do They Give Rise to Enforceable Legal Rights? The
United Nations Charter, the Byrd Amendment and a Self-Executing Treaty Analysis, 9 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 298, 299-301 (1976).
28 Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
29 Id.
30 See generally U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cI. 2.
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ganization (ITO).3 1 When the Truman administration dropped its
efforts to seek Senate consent to the Havana Charter establishing the
ITO, the GATT was adopted by agreement to the Protocol for Provi-
sional Application of October 30, 1947.32 Thus, the GAT was en-
tered on behalf of the United States through executive agreement.
Like treaties, executive agreements create law applicable in U.S.
courts if they are entered with proper Presidential authority,33 and do
not conflict with subsequent legislation 4.3  Also like treaties, the lan-
guage of an executive agreement will be applied to disputes before
U.S. courts only if it is self-executing in nature.
While no case has addressed directly the question of whether a
provision of the GAT is self-executing, a 1960 Opinion of the Cali-
fornia Attorney General concluded that the words of paragraph 1 of
the Protocol of Provisional Application created a self-executing obli-
gation that combined with the national treatment provisions of GATT
Article I to invalidate portions of the California Buy-America Act.
3 6
Case law also has addressed the application of GATT Articles I,31
111,38 XI,39 XIX, 40 XXVII, 41 and XXVIII, but without clear results on
31 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization and Final Act and Related Documents, Havana, Cuba, November 21,
1947, to March 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4/1948. For a discussion of the events leading up to
the Havana Charter, see the following: WrLLjAM A. BROWN, JR., THE UNrrED STATES AND THE
RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 15-160 (1950); GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMER-
CIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES 15-33 (1965); WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., THE
END OF THE ITO (PRINCETON ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FrNANCE No. 16, 1952); RICHARD N.
GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTrVE (new, expanded edition
with rev. intro. 1980); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969);
CLAIRE WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 3-52 (1949).
32 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 stat. A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
33 For a discussion concluding that the GATT is a valid executive agreement authorized by
Congress, see Brand, supra note 15. See also Robert Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the
Domestic Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrY AND GATT 187 (Meinhard
Hilf et al. eds., 1986); John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250 (1967); Note, United States Participation in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 505 (1961). For a discussion of the
concept of direct application generally, see John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992).
34 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
35 See, eg., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,230-31 (1942) and United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (holding self-executing executive agreements superior to state law).
36 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147 (Cal. 1960).
37 See American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050, 1059 n.14 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
United States v. Star Industries, Inc., 462 F.2d 557 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
38 See China Liquor Distrib. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); Bercut-Vandervoort and Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942
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the question of self-execution.42 Courts instead have implied author-
ity for the GATT without any complete self-execution analysis.
Federal court decisions considering the GAT] provide little gui-
dance because they consistently have rejected arguments that ques-
tioned legislation or administrative acts violate GATT obligations.43
Although courts have assumed GAY]? authority in making these de-
terminations (thereby providing implicit authority for the self-execut-
ing status of the GATT provisions addressed), the outcome in each
case has made it unnecessary to provide a rationale for such an as-
sumption. One group of federal cases determined that the now-aban-
doned "wine gallon" method of determining the application of U.S.
excise taxes to distilled spirits did not violate national treatment obli-
gations under GATT Article III because the tax was applied in a non-
(C.C.P.A. 1957), 46 C.C.P.A. 28 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959); Select Tire Salvage Co.
v. United States, 386 F.2d 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Delta Chemical Corp. v. Ocean County Utilities
Auth., 554 A.2d 1381 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); Association of Alabama Prof'l Numisma-
tists, Inc. v. Eagerton, 455 So. 2d 867 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Armstrong v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5
N.J. Tax 117 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983), affd, 6 N.J. Tax 447 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984); K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (NJ. 1977),
appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of Erie,
297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part on other grounds, 302 N.Y.S.2d
61 (1969); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Territory of Hawaii v. Hawaii, 41 Haw. 565 (1957); 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 65 (Cal. 1962); 36
Op. Att'y Gen. 147 (Cal. 1960); 34 Opp. Att'y Gen. 302 (Cal. 1959).
39 See U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
40 See Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd without opinion,
614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979).
41 George E. Bardwil & Sons v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 118 (1955).
42 See United States v. Star Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972).
43 See, e.g., Farr Man & Co. v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 908 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (MFN
provisions of Art. I considered effective, but superseded through later-in-time rule by amend-
ments to § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act delegating authority to President to adjust
quotas in response to surges in sugar imports); U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683
F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (sugar quotas authorized by language inserted in a U.S. tariff conces-
sion did not violate prohibition of quotas in GATT Art. XI); Michelin Tire Corp. v. United
States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981) (plaintiff contested countervailing duty determination, alleg-
ing violation of Art. VI in Treasury Decision's failure to make determination of injury. Argu-
ment rejected based on Protocol of Provisional Application grandfather clause for pre-existing
inconsistent legislation); American Express Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050, 1059 n.14
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (rejected allegations of violation of Art. I MFN obligations (and MFN require-
ments under FCN treaty with Italy) in subsidies case where importer alleged other nations had
similarly rebated tax and the United States had not imposed similar countervailing duties against
those nations).
One case, Regiomontana v. United States, 64 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) struck down the
imposition of countervailing duties accumulating after Mexico became entitled to an injury anal-
ysis under the Tokyo Round GATT Subsidies Code, as in violation of GAIT obligations. Id at
1580. Thus, it arguably exists as authority for the application of GATT rules directly to invali-
date agency action.
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discriminatory manner.44 Other cases carefully avoid responding to
allegations of GAIT applicability.45 None of these cases provides
useful analysis of the self-executing status of GATT provisions.
One group of federal cases focuses on the issue of authority for
entering into the GAT, finding that it does not have treaty status,
thereby avoiding the issue of self-execution.46 Conversely, the case of
United States v. Star Industries47 assumes both binding authority and
self-executing status for the GATT without ever raising either issue
for specific discussion. The plaintiffs in that case asserted that section
252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,48 which authorized the Presi-
dent to amend tariff schedules in response to unfair trade practices by
other countries, required that such retaliatory amendment be targeted
solely at the offending party. The court never raised the question of
whether (and how) the GAT has legal status in such a dispute.
Rather, it simply assumed such status and found that the most-fa-
44 China Liquor Distrib. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 962 (1965); Bercut-Vandervoort v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942 (C.C.P.A. 1957), 46
C.C.P.A. 28 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959). The Bercut-Vandervoort case included an
interesting dissent by Judge Donlan providing analysis of the GATT as a treaty obligation and
considering the application of the grandfather clause contained in the Protocol of Provisional
Application as well as the later-in-time rule of treaty application. See also Schieffelin & Co. v.
United States, 424 F.2d 1396 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970), in which the court
considered allegations that the distilled spirits excise tax was in violation of the Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation treaty with Ireland.
45 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 439 n.4 (1979) (dis-
missed as "frivolous" an argument that California ad valorem property tax applied to Japanese
shipping companies' cargo containers, which were also taxed in Japan, violated Art. III national
treatment obligations); Algoma Steel Corp., Ltd. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989) ("We have also considered the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Congress no doubt meant to conform the statutory language to the
GATI, but we are not persuaded it embodies any clear position contrary to ours. Should there
be a conflict, the United States legislation must prevail."); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) (instructed district court,
on remand, to consider treaty obligations under GATr in shaping remedy for possible antitrust
violation); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (avoided address-
ing GATI, but indicated "the need to consider the intention and effect of GATT and the Gov-
ernment's policy with respect to GATr whether or not GATr is mandatorily prohibitive" in
ordering hearing on remand); Select ire Salvage Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 1008 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (action to recover excise tax paid on imported tire carcasses decided on grounds of Con-
gressional intent without need to refer to GATT).
46 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Sneaker Circus, Inc. v.
Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); These cases were either decided on narrow grounds
making the issue of GATT applicability irrelevant or in a manner that determined that, even if
the GATT were applicable and self-executing, there was no GATI" violation. See Brand, supra
note 15, at 490-91.
47 United States v. Star Indus., 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
48 876 Stat. 872 (1962) (now the more familiar section 301 of the Trade Agreements Act of
1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
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vored-nation obligations in Article I of the General Agreement re-
quired any retaliation under Article XXVIII to be generalized in
accordance with MFN principles.49 It then found that section 252 did
not require tariff adjustments "inconsistent with our international ob-
ligations."5 The court thus relied on the GATT to defeat the argu-
ment of the plaintiff that targeted retaliation was required. By finding
the questioned legislation consistent with GAIT obligations, the Star
Industries case implies self-execution for Article I of the GAIT.
However, neither it nor any other federal case has actually analyzed
the self-executing status of any GAIT provision in regard to an al-
leged violation through federal legislation or administrative
regulation.
In contrast to the review of challenges to federal law, decisions
dealing with alleged state law violations of GATT have at times found
such violations to exist, thereby clearly implying self-executing status
for the GATT provisions involved. This has been done, however,
without any explicit self-execution analysis. In one of the earliest
state cases directly to address the applicability of the GAIT, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a state statute requiring sellers of
eggs of foreign origin to display a placard bearing the words "WE
SELL FOREIGN EGGS," contravened the national treatment obli-
gations contained in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the GATT.5'
This case remains one of the few to address directly the question of
the authority behind the GAIT, specifically noting that the "constitu-
tionality of the grant of such authority [to enter into trade agreements
under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930] has been repeatedly ques-
tioned in and out of Congress."52 The court concluded that the GAIT
is "a treaty within the meaning of [Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion], so that it has the same efficacy as a treaty made by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.15 3 While specifi-
cally addressing the binding authority of the GAIT as U.S. law, the
case did not, however, provide explicit analysis of the issue of self-
execution. It rather assumed such effect in finding GAIT Article III
to prevail over the state law measure involved.
Three Opinions of the California Attorney General reached a
similar result in considering that state's "buy American" legislation
49 462 F.2d at 563.
50 Id. at 564.
51 Territory of Hawaii v. Hawaii, 41 Haw. 565 (1957).
52 Id. at 567.
53 Id. at 568.
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under GAIT Article II.s4 These opinions also found GATT to have
"supreme law of the land" status under Article VI, clause 2, of the
Constitution.5 5 A contract for the purchase of turbine generator units
by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power from a Swiss
corporation was determined properly awarded, with the "buy Ameri-
can" statute found to be inapplicable. 6 Similarly, a contract for the
purchase of pumps and motors for the production of electricity was
found not subject to the statute.5 7 However, when the purchase was
for "governmental purposes," the exception contained in paragraph
8(a) of Article III was found to allow the application of the "buy
American" statute, even though it was an expression of state, rather
than federal, policy.58 A subsequent decision of the California First
District Court of Appeal similarly struck down a provision of a San
Francisco contract proposal (designed to comply with the state buy
American statute) that would have required that equipment furnished
under the proposal be manufactured in the United States.5 9
Other state cases have considered the GATT but have not relied
upon it to invalidate inconsistent legislation or contract provisions.
Two New Jersey cases and a Tennessee Attorney General's Opinion
have implied self-execution in the application of the GATT but found
that the situations involved were within the Article III, paragraph
8(a), "governmental purposes" exception to national treatment re-
54 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 65 (Cal. 1962); 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147 (Cal. 1960); 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 302
(Cal. 1959).
55 The 1960 opinion not only implied full treaty status for the GATT in the context of the
supremacy clause, but also found that the national treatment obligations of Article III were self-
executing and required no further legislation. 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147, 149 (Cal. 1960):
GAFT, as a multilateral trade agreement, has the legal force of a treaty under the
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution... and its obligations are treaty obligations ....
Paragraphs 4 and 8(a) of Article III indicate a mandatory duty .... Section 1 of the Proto-
col of Provisional Application ... does not have the effect of changing the national treat-
ment provisions of Paragraph 4 of Article III of Part II into executory provisions requiring
further congressional action to make the provisions operative.
56 Id. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 302 (Cal. 1959).
57 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 147 (Cal. 1960).
58 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 65 (Cal. 1962). Subparagraph 8(a) of Article III provides: "The provi-
sions of this article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procure-
ment by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a
view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale."
GATT, supra note 14, art. III.
59 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Ct. of the City and County of San Francisco, 25
Cal. Rptr. 798 (1st Dist. 1962) ("Compacts and similar international agreements, such as GATr,
which are negotiated and proclaimed by the President are 'treaties' within the ... supremacy
clause of the Constitution."). But see American Institute for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of
Erie, 297 N.Y.S.2d 602,607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 302
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1969) ("buy American" resolution found not to violate GATI where "it is this
Court's opinion that the GATF provisions are not here applicable").
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quirements of other provisions of Article 111.60 Cases in New Jersey
and Alabama have determined that state sales taxes applied to the
sale of gold coins were not in contravention of national treatment ob-
ligations, even though original issue of such coins by the U.S. treasury
could not constitutionally be taxed by the states.6 '
The best that can be said from this survey of U.S. law is that deci-
sions consistently have implied self-executing status for GATT provi-
sions in considering challenges to conflicting state law measures, and
one state Attorney General's opinion has specifically found GATT
Article III to be self-executing.6' Cases considering challenges to fed-
eral law on the basis of the GATr carefully have avoided the issue by
founding decisions on other grounds. Only the Star Industries case
can be said clearly to have implied self-executing status for a provision
of the GATr in the face of a challenge to federal law.63 Even there, it
is difficult to carry the opinion too far because the court (by demon-
strating consistency between the GATT and the law in question) was
using the GATT to defeat the plaintiff's allegation of invalidity of fed-
eral law, rather than in finding a conflicting law invalid.64 Thus, the
rule applied by the court arose out of a federal statute, supported by
the GATT, and not out of the GATT itself.
C. Statutory Restrictions on Self-Execution of International Trade
Agreements
In the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Congress made clear that
the implementation of the Tokyo Round agreements, negotiated
under the GATT framework, would not allow any provision of those
agreements to prevail over a U.S. statute, regardless of when the stat-
ute was enacted.65 The same Act further provided that the implemen-
tation of the Tokyo Round agreements was not to be "construed as
60 Delta Chemical Corp. v. Ocean County Utilities Authority and Allied Colloids, Inc., 554
A.2d 1381 (1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 594 A.2d 1343 (1991); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp.
v. North Jersey Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (NJ. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982
(1978); Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-303A, 1978 WL 27244 (Tenn. A.G.).
61 Association of Alabama Professional Numismatists v. Eagerton Inc., 455 So. 2d 867 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1984) (GATr not applicable because sales tax was not related to imports and exports);
Armstrong v. Taxation Division Director, 5 NJ. Tax 117 (NJ. Tax Ct. 1983), aff'd, 6 N.J. Tax 447
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (no violation because sales tax was applied uniformly and did not
result in discrimination).
62 See supra note 55.
63 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
64 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
65 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 144, 148 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2504(a)(1994)):
(a) United States statutes to prevail in conflict
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creating any private right of action or remedy for which provision is
not specifically made in the implementing legislation.
66
The opposition to treaty priority (but not so clearly to direct ef-
fect of international trade agreements) continued in the United
States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act.67 The
Act clearly states that "[n]o provision of the Agreement, nor the ap-
plication of any such provisions to any person or circumstance, which
is in conflict with any law of the United States shall have effect."68 As
to the relationship between the Free Trade Agreement and state law,
however, the Act provides for clear preemption: "The provisions of
the Agreement prevail over (A) any conflicting State law; and (B) any
conflicting application of any State law to any person or circumstance;
to the extent of the conflict.
'69
No provision of any trade agreement approved by the Congress under section 2503(a),
nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is in conflict
with any statute of the United States shall be given effect under the laws of the United
States.
This provision was cited by the Court of International Trade in countering a claim that the Inter-
national Trade Commission's practice of cumulation of sales from multiple countries in making
injury determinations violated GATT Article VI and Article I of the Tokyo Round Antidumping
Code. Fundicao Tapy S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898, 902 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 859
F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("even if we were to reach the conclusion that the operation of the
cumulation provision violated the GATr Code, we would be bound to give primacy to the law of
the United States in accordance with the direction in 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a)"). See also Footwear
Distributors and Retailers of America v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994); Mississippi Poultry Ass'n Inc. v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365-66 (5th Cir.), amended, 9
F.3d 1113 (1993), on rehearing, 31 F.3d 293 (1994); Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v.
United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Prior to the 1979 Act, Congress had been careful to avoid explicit approval or rejection of
GATr in any clear manner. In each of the 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1958 acts extending the
authority of the President to negotiate trade agreements, Congress included the language, "the
enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine or indicate the approval or disap-
proval by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade." Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, sec. 10, 65 Stat. 72, 75; Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1953, ch. 348, § 103, 67 Stat. 472; Act of July 1, 1954, ch. 445, § 3,
68 Stat. 360; Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 3(a), 69 Stat. 162, 163; Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1958, § 10, 72 Stat. 673, 680. No such disclaimer was included in
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,76 Stat. 872. The Trade Act of 1974 stated
that Congress was not implying approval or disapproval "of all articles" of the GATT. Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1987 (1975). It was in the 1974 Act,
however, that Congress for the first time authorized payment of the U.S. share of GATT ex-
penses, and directed the President to conform with GATT balance-of-payment restrictions and
consider "the international obligations of the United States" in import relief actions. Id.
§ 122(a) and § 203(k).
66 Trade Agreements Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 3(0, 93 Stat. 144, 148 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2504(0(1980)).
67 Pub. L. No. 100-449, § 102, 102 Stat. 1851, 1853 (1988).
68 Id. § 102(a).
69 Id. § 102(b)(1).
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Similar language regarding conflicts with federal law was in-
cluded in the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act in 1993.70 The North American Free Trade Agreement's
(NAFTA) relationship to state law, however, is more complex because
of the establishment of intergovernmental policy advisory committees
on trade. These committees are to discuss and insure conformity of
state laws with treaty commitments. 71 The Implementation Act fur-
ther removed any direct effect of the NAFTA in actions brought by
private parties, by providing that state laws could be declared invalid
as inconsistent with the NAFTA only in an action brought by the
United States expressly for that purpose72 and that no person other
than the United States has any cause of action under the NAFTA or
its side agreements on environment and labor, or "may challenge, in
any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United
States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground
that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the Agreement, the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, or the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. '73
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 continued this pro-
gression toward full prohibition of direct effect of international trade
agreements in challenges to either federal or state law.74 Section 102
of the Act (1) denies effect to any Uruguay Round Agreement provi-
sion "that is inconsistent with any law of the United States;" (2) pro-
vides that only the United States government can bring an action to
challenge the validity of a state law as inconsistent with a Uruguay
Round provision; and (3) provides that no private party may challenge
any law or act of the federal government or any state government as
inconsistent with a provision of any Uruguay Round Agreement.75
70 Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 102(a)(1), 107 Stat. 2057 (1992)(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (Supp.
1996)).
71 Id. § 102(b).
72 Id. § 102(b)(2).
73 Id. § 102(c).
74 Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809.
75 The language of the Act reads as follows:
Sec. 102. RELATIONSHIP OF THE AGREEMENTS TO UNITED STATES LAW AND
STATE LAW.
(a) Relationship of Agreements to United States Law. -
(1) United States law to prevail in conflict. - No provision of any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or cir-
cumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.
(b) ....
(2) Legal challenge. -
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The Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act reinforces the no-direct-effect statements in
the Act by specifically stating that "[i]f there is a conflict between U.S.
law and any of the Uruguay Round agreements, section 102(a) of the
implementing bill makes clear that U.S. law will take precedence.
'76
Thus, in determining the language of the various acts implement-
ing the most recent trade agreements, Congress and the President
have made clear the intention to bar private parties from any use of
the provisions of those agreements in challenges to federal, state or
local laws. Despite the fact that earlier decisions indicated a basis for
the direct effect of GATT provisions - at least in challenges against
(A) In general. - No State law, or the application of such a State law, may be de-
clared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or
application is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an
action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or applica-
tion invalid.
ie)" Effect of Agreement With Respect to Private Remedies. -
(1) Limitations. - No person other than the United States -
(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement, or
(B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or
inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States,
any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or
inaction is inconsistent with such agreement.
(2) Intent of Congress. - It is the intention of the Congress through paragraph (1) to
occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or defense under or in connection
with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including by precluding any person
other than the United States from bringing any action against any State or political
subdivision thereof or raising any defense to the application of State law under or in
connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements -
(A) on the basis of a judgment obtained by the United States in an action brought
under any such agreement; or
(B) on any other basis.
Id. § 102.
76 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., H. Doe. 103-316, vol. I, 659 (1994). It is important to keep in mind that under these
provisions statutes trump treaties only when there is actual conflict between the two. "[Tihe
initial inquiry is whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise point at issue." Footwear
Distributors & Retailers of Am. v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984). In determining the
intent of Congress, however, "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains, and, consequently, can never be construed
to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of
nations as understood in this country." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
63, 118 (1804). The Supreme Court has taken the position that the Chevron rule of deference to
agency interpretations of congressional intent is secondary to the Charming Betsy doctrine of
avoidance of conflict with international obligations. Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988). See also Federal Mogul
Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572,1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Footwear Distributors & Retailers of
Am., 852 F. Supp. at 1091.
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state laws 77 - even provisions of the 1948 GATT that remain un-
changed by the Uruguay Round Agreements are unlikely to provide a
foundation for a challenge to a statute. The lid on the coffin of direct
effect of these international trade agreements appears securely sealed
in the United States.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION DOCrRINE OF Dirncr EiFcrs
A. Direct Effect of the Rome Treaty and Community Legislation
In the European Union, the direct effects doctrine was developed
in cases concerning the application of Community law before national
courts.78 The European Court of Justice has followed a steady course
in finding Community law to be both directly effective in the national
courts of the Member States and to have primacy over national legis-
lation.79 The more difficult issue is the place of international agree-
ments other than the European Community treaties in both
Community and Member State law.,
The question of the invocation of Community law before national
courts arose early in the European Court's history with the case of
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen.80 A
Dutch importer challenged the transfer of ureaformaldehyde from
one tariff class to another by the Netherlands government on the
grounds that it increased the import duties contrary to Article 12 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community."' In de-
termining whether national courts must protect rights emanating from
the Treaty, the Court found it "necessary to consider the spirit, the
general scheme and the wording of those provisions."'  In looking at
the entire Treaty, the Court emphasized that the language of the pre-
amble, the establishment of community institutions endowed with sov-
ereign rights, and the purpose of securing uniform interpretation of
77 The question of application of trade agreement provisions in challenges to local ordi-
nances may remain open.
78 Infra notes 80-99.
79 See, e.g., Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect". An Infant Disease of Commu-
nity Law, 8 EuRo. L. REv. 155 (1983).
80 Case 26162, N.V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Ondememing Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105.
81 Article 12 of the EC Treaty reads as follows: "[m]ember States shall refrain from intro-
ducing, between themselves, any new customs duties on importation or exportation or charges
with equivalent effect and from increasing such duties or charges as they apply in their commer-
cial relations with each other." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 19.
82 1963 E.C.R. at 12.
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Community law found in Article 177 all indicated that the Treaty was
intended to create rights for individuals as well as for Member
States.83
The Van Gend en Loos decision went on to consider the specific
wording of Article 12, determining that it "must be interpreted as pro-
ducing direct effects and creating individual rights which national
courts must protect."' The language of Article 12 was found entitled
to such effect because it was clear and unconditional, required no im-
plementing legislation by the Member States, and provided no margin
of discretion in its application.8 5 In such circumstances, again consid-
ering the "spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Treaty,"
the court found the "vigilance of individuals concerned to protect
their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the su-
pervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the
Commission and of the Member States."86 Thus, enforcement of this
provision of the Treaty is not only a function of the institutions of the
Community and the governments of its Member States, but also of the
citizens of the CommunityY
The European Court of Justice subsequently has expanded the
concept of direct effects by finding that additional Articles of the
Rome Treaty are directly effective in challenges of Member State
laws, 88 that certain articles are directly effective in disputes between
83 Id. The Court's conclusion is oft-quoted:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legis-
lation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individ-
uals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal
heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but
also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon indi-
viduals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.
84 Id. at 13.
85 Id.; see P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN CONzi.UNTms 334 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1989):
A consistent line of case-law shows that a provision can have direct effect if the obligation
imposed on Member States is (A) clear and precise and (B) unconditional and, if imple-
menting measures are provided for, (C) the Community Institutions or the Member States
are not allowed any margin of discretion.
86 Van Gend en Los, 1963 E.C.R. at 13.
87 This language of Van Gend en Loos bears striking similarity to the U.S. rationale for pri-
vate treble damage actions in antitrust matters; a somewhat ironic similarity in light of consistent
European criticism of this aspect of U.S. law.
88 See, e.g., Ltlttcke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, 1966 E.C.R. 205, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 674 (Ar-
ticle 95 is directly effective); Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425
(Articles 37 and 53 are directly effective, while Articles 93 and 102 are not).
573
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private parties ("horizontal" direct effect),89 and that regulations,9" di-
rectives, 91 and decisions9z promulgated under Article 189 of the
Treaty may all be directly effective.93 In fact, as to Community law, it
has been said that "the direct effect of a Community rule is the gen-
eral rule in the Community legal order rather than the exception."94
Not only is the direct effects concept deeply entrenched in Com-
munity law, but it is strengthened further by the Community concept
of primacy. Community law takes precedence over national law of a
Member State,95 even if the national law measure is adopted after the
effective date of the Community law measure.96 "[E]very national
89 See, e.g., Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne
Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 631, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (Article 119 provision that "men and women
should receive equal pay for equal work" applies to dispute between air hostess and airline that
paid cabin steward more for same work); but see Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), 1986 E.C.R. 723, 749, [1986] 1
C.M.L.R. 688,711 (denying horizontal direct effect to a directive which otherwise imposed obli-
gations on Member States. Obligations imposed by a directive exist only on the part of "each
Member State to which it is addressed."). For a discussion of the horizontal direct effect concept
see KAPirYN & vAN THEMAAT, supra note 85, at 346-48.
90 See, e.g., Case 65/75, Ex parte Tasca, 1976 E.C.R. 291, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 183; Case 34/73,
Variola v. Italian Finance Ministry, 1973 E.C.R. 981; Case 39/72, Commission v. Italian Republic,
1973 E.C.R. 101, [1973] 12 C.M.L.R. 439; see also Case 87/82, Rogers v. Darthenay, 1983 E.C.R.
1579, 1591, [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 135, 145; Case 94/77, Fratelli Zerbone S.n.c. v. Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato, 1978 E.C.R. 99, 115-16; Case 43/71, Politi S.A.S. v. Ministry of Finance
of the Italien Republic, 1971 E.C.R. 1039, 1048, [1973] 12 C.M.L.R. 60, 70.
91 See, e.g., Case 71/85, State of Netherlands v. Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging, 1986
E.C.R. 3855, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 767; Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, 1979 E.C.R.
1629, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96; Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1
C.M.L.R. 1.
92 See, e.g., Case 20/70, Transports Lesage & Cie v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg, 1970 E.C.R. 861,
874, [1971] C.M.L.R. 1, 30; Case 9/70, Grad v. Ginanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, 838-838,
[1971] C.M.L.R. 1, 24-25.
93 See KAPTEYN & VAN Tm~MAAT, supra note 85, at 345:
A regulation does not need to be and may not be transformed into national law unless it
specifically requires or empowers Member States to adopt implementing measures. A di-
rectly effective provision of the Treaties needs by very definition no transformation into
national law, whilst a directly effective provision of a directive has this effect despite the fact
that it needs such transformation by definition. (It is, of course, given direct effect precisely
because the transformation which should have taken place has not occurred). ... All in all
there is good reason to prefer, like the Court, to avoid the term "direct effect" in the case of
directives and instead to speak of "similar effects." (footnotes omitted).
94 Gerhard Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect:
From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 s/1 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 35, 72 (1983).
For a useful discussion of the direct effects doctrine generally see Pescatore, supra note 79.
95 See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425, 456 (EC
Treaty Article 177 allowing referral by national courts for preliminary rulings on the interpreta-
tion of Community law, "is to be applied regardless of any domestic law, whenever questions
relating to the interpretation of the Treaty arise.").
96 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629,
643, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 283.
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court must.., apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights
which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside
any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior
or subsequent to the Community rule."' 97 When the doctrine of pri-
macy is combined with that of direct effect, directly effective Commu-
nity law supersedes all conflicting national law measures regardless of
which was first enacted. Thus, a national legislature cannot contra-
vene what has been or is later enacted within the framework of the
law of the European Community.98 This delegation of sovereign func-
tions is considered unique to the structure of the Community and fun-
damental to the "new legal order of international law" created by the
Rome Treaty.99
B. The Direct Effects Doctrine and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
1. The No Direct Effects Ruling of International Fruit
The direct effects doctrine was first applied by the European
Court of Justice to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the
International Fruit case of 1972.100 In this case, import certificates for
apples from a non-Member State were denied by the Netherlands on
the basis of Council regulations aimed at protecting the markets of
Community apple producers. The importer challenged the denial and
the regulations on the basis of GAT" Article XI which provides that
"[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges .... shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
97 1978 E.C.R. at 644.
98 This preemptive role of Community law was earlier stated with specific reference to
GATr in Case 10161, Commission v. Italy, 1962 E.C.R. 1, 10, [1962] C.M.L.R. 187, 203:
... by virtue of the principles of international law, by assuming a new obligation which is
incompatible with rights held under a prior treaty a State ipso facto gives up the exercise of
these rights to the extent necessary for the performance of its new obligations.
in fact, in matters governed by the EEC Treaty, that Treaty takes precedence over agree-
ments concluded between Member States before its entry into force, including agreements
made within the framework of GATI'.
99 Case 26162, N.V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105.
100 Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (hereinafter International Fruit). Earlier cases had
made mention of the General Agreement and negotiations under it, but only in a fashion that
did not directly address whether it could be a source of law to be applied by the European Court.
See, eg., Interfood GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, 1972 E.C.R. 2442, [1973] 12
C.M.L.R. 562, 576 (challenge to provision of Common Customs Tariff defeated by reference to
Kennedy Round negotiations and expectations of other GAWT contracting parties arising out of
those negotiations).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:556 (1996-97)
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other con-
tracting party." 101 The importer alleged that the restrictions on im-
ports violated this GATr prohibition on quantitative restrictions. In
order to succeed, it was necessary for the importer to show that Arti-
cle XI of the GAIT was directly effective, creating rights capable of
enforcement by individuals before courts within the European
Community.
In addressing the GATT issue, the Court first found it necessary
to determine that the General Agreement was binding upon the Com-
munity.10 2 The Community had not been in existence upon either the
creation of the GATC in 1948 or the later adherence to the GATT by
the Member States of the Community.1 3 Nevertheless, the Court
found a clear intention on the part of the Member States that the
Community assume the functions inherent in tariff and trade policy
and be bound by the obligations entered into under the General
Agreement. This intent was found in Article 110 of the EC Treaty
(seeking "the adherence of the Community to the same aims as those
sought by the General Agreement"), the first paragraph of Article 234
(providing that the EC Treaty did not affect pre-existing multilateral
agreement rights and obligations), and the common commercial policy
provisions of Articles 111 and 113.104 The binding nature of the
GATT was further supported by the recognition by other GAIT con-
tracting parties of the European Community role in representing the
Member States in GATT matters.
10 5
The International Fruit decision then followed the analysis set out
in the direct effects test of Van Gend en Loos to determine whether
such a binding agreement also created rights capable of being asserted
by individuals in challenging Community law.106 Rather than looking
directly to Article XI of the GATI, however, the Court first consid-
ered "the spirit, the general scheme and the terms of the General
Agreement."107 The Court determined the GAIT preamble to be
"based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of
'reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements,"' and the Gen-
101 GATr, supra note 14, art. XI.
102 International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. at 1226.
103 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Participation of the European Communities in the GA7T
International Law and Community Law Aspects, in MixnD AGREEMENTs 167 (David O'Keefe &
Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983).
104 International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. at 1227.
105 Id.
106 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
107 International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. at 1227.
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eral Agreement itself to be "characterized by the great flexibility of its
provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation,
the measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficul-
ties and the settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties." '
These findings were deemed sufficient for the Court to conclude, with-
out ever addressing the language of Article XI directly, that "Article
XI of the General Agreement is not capable of conferring on citizens
of the Community rights which they can invoke before the courts."'10 9
In Schlater v. Hauptzollamt Ldrrach,110 the Court's next opportu-
nity to consider the General Agreement, it was argued that Commu-
nity Regulations had the effect of increasing duties on imports of
cheese from Switzerland above those to which the Community was
bound under GATT Article II. The Court simply paraphrased the
language of the International Fruit decision in denying direct effect to
Article II.111
In Nederlandse Spoorwegen,"12 the Court focused on the primacy
of Community law, ignoring arguments that the national law involved
(Dutch) may have recognized direct effects of GATT' provisions:
since so far as fulfilment of the commitments provided for by GATT is
concerned, the Community has replaced the Member States, the
mandatory effect, in law, of these commitments must be determined by
reference to the relevant provisions in the Community legal system and
not to those which gave them their previous force under the national
legal systems.1
13
In Nederlandse Spoorwegen, an interpretive note to a regulation on
classification under the Common Customs Tariff, that had the effect of
raising the tariff on certain duplicating machines by moving them to a
new class in the customs law of the Netherlands, was challenged on
the basis of the tariff concessions agreed to by the Community under
108 Id. The Court specifically focused on (1) the dispute resolution provisions of Article
XXII, the first paragraph of which requires that in a dispute a party is to give "sympathetic
consideration to ... representations... made by any other contracting party," and the second
paragraph of which provides that "the contracting parties... may consult" with the parties to a
dispute if no adequate bilateral solution is reached, (2) the further dispute resolution provisions
of Article XXIII, using terms such as "sympathetic consideration," "recommendations," and
"consultations," and allowing contracting parties to suspend obligations, and (3) Article XIX,
which allows a contracting party unilaterally to suspend obligations and modify concessions pre-
viously made. Id. at 1228.
109 Id..
110 Case 9/73, SchltIter v. Hauptzollamt ULrrach, 1973 E.C.R. 1135.
111 Id. at 1157-58.
112 Case 38175, Douaneagent der Nedeflandse Spoorwegen NV v. Inspecteur der Invoer-
rechten en Accijnzen, 1975 E.C.R. 1439, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 167.
113 Id. at 1450.
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GAIT Article II. The Court ultimately found consistency with the
GATT, avoiding the direct effect issue.
Several years later, in the Diirbeck case,114 the Court was asked
to consider the direct effect of GAT Article XIII in a case contesting
Community quantitative restrictions on apples from Chile. The Court
disposed of the allegations by reference to dispute settlement proce-
dures that had already occurred in the matter within the GATr
framework, assuming from "uncontested" representations by the
Commission that no substantial violation had been found." 5
On March 16, 1983, the Court issued three decisions in cases rais-
ing direct effect issues involving the General Agreement.1 6 Unlike
earlier cases challenging Community law as inconsistent with GAIT
provisions, these cases all challenged national law measures. In Am-
ministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana
SpA, 1 17 an Italian duty for administrative services was challenged as a
charge on imports inconsistent with GAIT Article II(1)(b) bound
concessions. The Court considered it "important that the provisions
of GATT should, like the provisions of all other agreements binding
the Community, receive uniform application throughout the Commu-
nity." 118 As such, it was determined that the European Court of Jus-
tice, and not national courts, had sole jurisdiction to interpret the
provisions of GAIT within the Community. 119 Relying on Interna-
tional Fruit and Schlllter, the Court rather easily determined that Arti-
cle II was incapable of direct effect, because the "general scheme" of
the GAIT made the entire agreement incapable of providing rules on
which individuals could rely in courts within the Community.
On the same day, in the S..O.T. case,120 the Court considered
certain Italian unloading charges against a challenge based on the
GAIT Article II prohibition of increases in bound tariffs, and the Ar-
ticle V guarantee of freedom of transit through the territory of con-
tracting parties to the GATT. Here, the Court repeated the notion
114 Case 112/80, Firma Anton DUrbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt con Main-Flughafen, 1981
E.C.R. 1095.
115 Id at 1120.
116 Joined Cases 267 to 269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SocietA Pe-
trolifera Italiana SpA (SPI), 1983 E.C.R. 801, [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 354; Case 266/81, Societd Ital-
iana per L'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT.) v. Ministero delle Finanze, 1983 E.C.R. 731; Joined
cases 290 to 291/81, Compagnia Singer SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finance dello Stato, 1983
E.C.R. 847.
117 Supra note 116.
118 Societa Petrolifera Italiana, SpA (SPI), 1983 E.C.R. at 828.
119 Id.
120 Societl Italiana per L'Oleodotto Transalpino (S.I.O.T.), 1983 E.C.R. at 731.
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that "the rules contained in GA'IT govern only the Community's rela-
tions with the other contracting parties and cannot be applied within
the Community itself."' 21 Although the Court found no enforceable
fights emanating from the GAIT applicable in the case at hand, it did
note that the notions of freedom of transit explicitly provided for in
the GATI were implied in Community law by "the existence within
the Community of a customs union characterised by the free move-
ment of goods."' 2 The Court also acknowledged that the inability of
individuals to rely upon the GATr in challenging the charges involved
"in no way affects the Community's obligation to ensure that the pro-
visions of GAT are observed in its relations with non-member States
which are parties to GATT."'2 3 This was insufficient, however, to pro-
vide any assistance to the complainant as a result of the application of
the direct effects doctrine.
The opportunity arose in a 1987 decision to address the direct
effect of GA'IT Article III as applied to Italian charges on imported
bananas. 24 Because the bananas had already been in free circulation
in another Member State, however, the Court avoided the GATT is-
sue by finding the matter governed by Article 95 of the EC Treaty.
2. Interpretation of GATT Agreements in the Application of
Community Legislation
The idea that International Fruit will always prevent the Euro-
pean Court of Justice from interpreting GAIT in a case involving a
private party was dispelled in Fidration de l'industrie de l'huilerie de
la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission.125 Fediol filed a complaint with the
Commission under Council Regulation No. 2641/84, alleging that Ar-
gentine differential charges and quantitative restrictions on soya beans
and related products were "illicit commercial practices."' 26 When the
Commission refused to institute GATT dispute resolution on Fediol's
behalf, 27 Fediol brought the matter before the Court under EC
Treaty Article 173. The Court held that Regulation 2641/84 confers
121 Id. at 776.
122 d. at 779. The Court went on, however, to find that Article 113 of the European Commu-
nity Treaty is not "sufficiently precise to enable an assessment of the contested transit rules to be
made." Id. at 780.
123 Id. at 780.
124 Case 193/85, ooperativa Co-Fruita Sri v. Amministrazione della Finanze dello Stato,
1987 E.C.R. 2085.
125 Case 70/87, F6d6ration de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission of the
European Communities, 1989 E.C.R. 1781, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 489.
126 1984 OJ. L-252/1.
127 Commission Decision 2506 (unpublished).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:556 (1996-97)
on private industry the right to invoke GAIT provisions in complaints
to the Commission, and that the Court has jurisdiction to review Com-
mission decisions applying the regulation.1' s This results from the reg-
ulation's reference to the application of "international law" by the
Commission in determining the existence of an "illicit commercial
practice." International law, for purposes of this provision, consists
primarily of the GATT. Thus, GAIT provisions are explicitly brought
into Community law through the regulation, and decisions of the
Commission applying the GAIT in that process are reviewable in a
manner requiring the Court to interpret the GAIT.129 The Fediol
Court ultimately interpreted Articles III, XI, XX and XXIII of the
GATT, finding the Commission's interpretation and application of
those provisions to be proper and no illicit commercial practice to
exist.1
30
The Fediol decision found that neither the general flexibility of
the GATI nor its dispute resolution provisions prevent the interpreta-
tion of specific GATT provisions that may be more precisely de-
fined. 3 ' To the extent Regulation 2641/84 gives private industry the
right to invoke the GATT in a complaint to determine whether a com-
mercial practice is illicit, the same parties have the right to go before
the Court in order to have judicial review of the decision of the Com-
mission in applying the GATF. Thus, general aspects of the GATT
that had seemed to prevent the direct effect of specific provisions in
International Fruit were, in Fediol, explicitly rejected as obstacles to
interpreting and applying those specific GATT provisions in the con-
text of a Commission decision.
Fediol differs from prior cases dealing with the GATT in two im-
portant aspects. First, all other decisions involving more than insignif-
icant discussion of the GATT were brought through national court
requests under Article 177 of the Rome Treaty for preliminary rulings
on Community law.132 In contrast, Fediol involved an action brought
128 1989 E.C.R. at 1831.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1832-36.
131 Id. at 1831.
132 The first International Fruit Company case ruled that the company's appeal to the Court
under Article 173 against Community regulations restricting apple imports was unfounded and
did not give significant discussion to the argument that the regulations violated the GAIT.
Joined Cases 41-44/70, International Fruit Co. and Others v. Commission of the European Com-
munities, 1971 E.C.R, 421. A case involving a challenge under Article 173 of provisions in a
Council antidumping regulation was based in part on allegations of nonconformity with GAIT
Article VI and the 1967 Antidumping Code. Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing Co. and Others v.
Council of the European Community, 1979 E.C.R. 1185. The Court found the challenged provi-
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by a private party in the European Court of Justice under Article 173,
challenging a Decision of the Commission. Second, prior challenges
based on GATT provisions were brought against either Community or
Member State measures. Fediol involved a request that the Commis-
sion challenge measures of a non-Member State (Argentina). Thus,
the Fediol holding may be limited to the interpretation of GATT pro-
visions specifically incorporated in a Community regulation for pur-
poses of considering the measures of another contracting party to the
GATT. No such regulation exists allowing a challenge to Community
or Member State measures. 33
In 1991, the Court followed the Fediol interpretation practice in
Nakafima All Precision Co. Ltd. v. Council.134 This time a Japanese
manufacturer of printers challenged the Council Regulation under
which an antidumping duty was assessed against its products. 3 5 Like
Fediol, the case was brought under Article 173 of the European Com-
munity Treaty, with an allegation that the Council Regulation was in
breach of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code. The Court found
that the regulation in question, "was adopted in order to comply with
the international obligations of the Community" as expressed in the
Antidumping Code. 3 6 Thus, it was necessary to interpret provisions
of the Antidumping Code, in order "to examine whether the Council
went beyond the legal framework thus laid down, as Nakajima claims,
and whether, by adopting the disputed provision, it acted in breach of
Article 2(4) and (6) of the Anti-Dumping Code."'1 37 Finding the regu-
lation to be in conformity with the relevant provisions of the An-
tidumping Code, the Court dismissed the invalidity argument.
sion of the regulation unlawful based on a prior Community regulation, without reference to the
GATr arguments. For an excellent review of direct action consideration of the GATT by the
European Court of Justice, see Marc Maresceau, The GATT in the Case Law of the European
Court of Justice, in THE EUROPEAN CorcmmuNrrY AND GATr 107 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds.,
1986).
133 The Commission decision was based solely on the application of GATI provisions, despite
the fact that the regulation allows the Commission to reject a complaint on grounds of "Commu-
nity interest." 1984 OJ. L-252/1. Thus, it is unlikely the facts of the Fediol case will come again
before the Court. The case itself will serve as a reminder to the Commission to include in any
future rejections of complaints the discretionary ground of Community interest.
134 Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council of the European Communities, 1991
E.C.R. 1-2069.
135 The antidumping action was begun under Council Regulation No. 2176/84 of 23 July 1984,
with the definitive duty being assessed under Council Regulation No. 2423/88 of 11 July 1988,
which had come into effect during the course of the antidumping proceeding. Id. at 1-2170.
136 Id. at 1-2178.
137 Id
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C. The Application of the International Fruit Test to Other
Agreements with Non-Member States
While the European Court of Justice consistently has found pro-
visions of the General Agreement incapable of having direct effect in
challenges to Member State and Community law, it has found directly
effective rules in the provisions of other Community trade agree-
ments. These decisions provide a useful comparison with the deci-
sions addressing the General Agreement.
The first case in which the Court found a provision of a trade
agreement to be directly effective was Bresciani v. Amministrazione
Italiana delle Finanze.138 An importer of raw cowhides from France
and Senegal challenged Italian public health inspection duties im-
posed on imports on the grounds that they were charges "having an
effect equivalent to customs duties," and therefore in violation of both
Article 13(2) of the European Community Treaty (in respect of im-
ports from France) and Article 2(1) of the Yaound6 Convention (as to
imports from Senegal). The Court held that Article 2(1) of the Ya-
ound6 Convention of 1963 confers on Community citizens "the right,
which the national courts of the Community must protect, not to pay
to a Member State a charge having an effect equivalent to customs
duties."'
139
In its arguments before the Court in Bresciani, the Commission
favored direct effect for Article 2(1) of Yaound6 Convention, because
that provision "refers expressly and unconditionally to certain articles
of the [European Community] Treaty," and was (in its 1969 version),
"in terms so unrestricted, clear and precise as to have direct effect in
the relations between the Member States and individuals."'140 Empha-
sizing the similarity of the language in the Yaound6 Convention and
the EC Treaty, the Commission took the view, "that the inclusion in
Article 2(1) of the first Yaound6 Convention of a reference to the
rules of the Treaty prohibiting the imposition of charges having
138 Case 87/75, 1976 E.C.R. 129, 2 C.M.L.R. 62 (1976). Earlier cases had addressed non-
GATT trade agreements, without specifically addressing the direct effects issue where such a
determination was not necessary to the decision in each case. See Case 181/73, Haegeman v.
Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 449, 459-561 (Court determined that Association Agreement with
Greece was an "integral part of Community law," but avoided a determination on its direct
effect by reviewing the Agreement and finding a countervailing duty on wine from Greece not
inconsistent with its terms); Case 40/72, Schroeder v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1973 E.C.R.
125 (direct effect of Article 41 of the Association Agreement with Greece implied by the Court
in determining that the Commission had discretion in interpretation of both the Agreement and
Community regulation regarding the import of tomato concentrate from Greece).
139 1976 E.C.R. at 142.
140 Id at 134.
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equivalent effect vests the article with the same authority as the provi-
sions to which it refers." 4 '
In addressing the direct effect question, the Bresciani Court fol-
lowed the analysis first set forth in International Fruit, looking to "the
spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Convention and of
the provision concerned."' 4 The effect of the Yaound6 provision
drew strength from the fact that it was concluded within the frame-
work of Article 228 of the EC Treaty. The "imbalance between the
obligations assumed by the Community towards the Associated
States, which is inherent in the special nature of the Convention, does
not prevent recognition by the Community that some of its provisions
have a direct effect."' 43 The inclusion in the Yaound6 Agreement of a
dispute settlement framework did not prevent direct effect, because
the abolition of charges having equivalent effect "must, on the part of
the Community, proceed automatically."'144 Thus, there was created a
mandatory treaty obligation, providing benefits for Member State na-
tionals as well as for the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) States.
The Court went on to review the Yaound6 Convention and its
explicit reference to Article 13 of the EC Treaty, finding that, "the
Community undertook precisely the same obligation towards the As-
sociated States to abolish charges having equivalent effect as, in the
Treaty, the Member States assumed towards each other.""'14 This obli-
gation was viewed as specific, and without any implied or express res-
ervation on the part of the Community, and therefore "capable of
conferring on those subject to Community law the right to rely on it
before the courts."'
146
Thus, the Yaound6 Convention was implicitly distinguished from
the GATE in regard to its negotiation and conclusion under Article
228 of the EC Treaty, its specific reference to Article 13 of the EC
Treaty, and its precise language. Neither the imbalance of the obliga-
tions assumed by the Community, as opposed to those assumed by the
ACP States, nor the inclusion of specific dispute settlement measures
141 Id at 135.
142 lId at 139.
143 Id at 140.
144 Id. at 141.
145 Id. at 141-42.
146 Id. at 141-42.
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(found to be evidence of a lack of direct effectiveness in regard to the
General Agreement in International Fruit) prevented direct effect. 47
Although other cases before the European Court of Justice dur-
ing the 1970's involved arguments that national measures were incon-
sistent with international obligations, none was decided on the basis of
those obligations, thereby avoiding the direct effects issue. 48 The
next case directly to address the issue was Polydor v. Harlequin Rec-
ord Shops.14 9 An English copyright licensee brought an infringement
action against the British importer of records purchased from the Por-
tuguese licensee. The defendant alleged that enforcement of U.K.
copyright law would violate the free trade agreement between the
Community and Portugal, Article 14(2) of which prohibited quantita-
tive restrictions on imports. On an Article 177 referral from the Court
of Appeal, itwas determined that the language of the free trade
agreement, which was identical to the language of Articles 30 and 36
147 Although the Bresciani Court avoided specific comparison with the analysis of the Gen-
eral Agreement in International Fruit, Advocate General Trabucchi specifically addressed the
difference between Yaoundd Article 2 and GATT Article XI, stating:
In contrast to what was observed in connexion with Article XI of GATT, which prohibits
the introduction of import and export quotas for products originating in the territory of
another of the contracting parties, the provision under consideration here makes the power
to derogate from it subject to substantive rules and to well-defined procedural require-
ments.... Recourse to the clause is permitted only as an exceptional measure, in case of
serious difficulties and on clearly defined conditions, expressed in terms comparable to
those of the safeguard clause in Article 226 of the EEC Treaty. Moreover, even when such
exceptional measures are adopted by Member States, they must be the subject of prior
authorization by the Community, and this ensures that the legality of the application of the
derogative provision is always subject to review by this Court.
Id. at 148-149.
148 Case 65/77, Razanatsimba, 1977 E.C.R. 2229, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 246 (in challenge by Mad-
agascan national to French requirement of nationality on basis of Lom6 Convention Article 62
calling for non-discriminatory treatment of ACP State nationals by Member States, Court con-
cluded that Article 62 does not require general application of reciprocal bilateral obligations
from other treaties with ACP States and that by itself it did not require nondiscrimination in
professional licensing), Case 52/77, Cayrol v. Rivoira, 1977 E.C.R. 2261 (French prohibition on
importation of Spanish table grapes upheld in challenge based on Free Trade Agreement with
Spain, finding that the import restrictions were not inconsistent with the terms of the Agree-
ment); Case 225/78, Procureur de la R6publique v. Bouhelier, 1979 E.C.R. 3151 (French certifi-
cation requirement for export of watches upheld against challenges based on Association
Agreement with Greece and Free Trade Agreements with Spain and Austria, finding that the
Agreements either did not contain prohibitions of such restrictions on exports or were not in
effect at the time of the exports in question, even though the Chatain case, infra, had found the
same requirement to be prohibited by Article 34(1) of the EC Treaty as a measure having an
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction); Case 65/69, Procureur de la Rrpublique v.
Chatain, 1980 E.C.R. 1345, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 418 (case decided on basis of EC Treaty provisions
where provision of Free Trade Agreement with Switzerland was raised in defense against French
criminal charges based on intercompany pricing rules).
149 Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 677.
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of the EC Treaty that earlier had been found to be directly effec-
tive,150 was not directly effective because of the different purposes of
the agreements.
The Commission, despite arguing in favor of direct effect for pro-
visions of the Yaound6 Convention in Bresciani, took a different posi-
tion in Polydor. It focused on the argument that the "aims" of the
international agreement were different from those of the EC Treaty,
and on the reciprocity argument that the Community would suffer by
granting direct effect to agreements that may not be granted similar
effect in the courts of the other parties to those, agreements. 151
The Polydor decision noted the "well-established case-law of the
Court," providing that restrictions on importation of a product "law-
fully ... placed on the market ... constitute a measure having an
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction for the purposes of Arti-
cle 30 of the [ECI Treaty," and are thus prohibited.151 It then deter-
mined that "whether the same interpretation must be placed on
Article 14(2) of the Agreement" must be determined "in the light of
both the object and purpose of the Agreement and of its wording."'53
The purpose of the free trade agreement was found to be "to elimi-
nate progressively the obstacles to substantially all their trade," "to
liberalize trade in goods between the Community and Portugal," and
to abolish "customs duties and.., charges having equivalent effect in
150 Case 78170, Deutsche Grammophon mbH v. Metro-SB-GroBmarkte GmbH, 1971 E.C.R.
487, [1971] 1 C.M.L.R. 631.
151 The Court stated:
The Commission is of the opinion that the concept of direct effect, as developed in Commu-
nity law, must not as such be transposed to the field of the Community's international rela-
tions, for two reasons. The first is based on the different nature and aims of international
agreements. The second reason is that it is necessary to maintain in the context of these
free-trade agreements a balance of the advantages and disadvantages which may exist be-
tween the parties to an international treaty.
With regard to the different nature and aims of international agreements, the Commission
emphasizes that those agreements do not provide for any harmonization of law or for a
common policy. Nor do they lay down rules for the judicial settlement of disputes by virtue
of which the provisions of the treaties are interpreted in a manner binding on all the con-
tracting parties.
As regards the need to maintain a proper balance of advantages and disadvantages between
the parties to an agreement, that balance is substantially different if private parties can
enforce an international agreement within the Community whilst they cannot do so in other
contracting States. Indeed, the stage may be reached at which non-member countries may
obtain all the rights of Community membership without having to assume the correspond-
ing obligations. That is particularly true with regard to the agreements between the Com-
munity and the former EFTA countries.
1982 E.C.R. at 343.
152 1982 E.C.R. at 346. This case law includes Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Tera-
nova Industrie, 1976 E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482, and Case 78/70, Deutsche Gram-
mophon mbH v. Metro-SB-GroBmarkte GmbH, 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971] 1 C.M.L.R. 631.
153 1982 E.C.R. at 346.
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trade." In other words, the purpose of the agreement was "expressed
in terms... similar to those of the EEC Treaty."'
1 54
The Court went on to find, however, that similarity of terms was
not in itself sufficient reason for applying Community law principles to
issues of protection of industrial and commercial property rights in the
context of a free trade agreement. 55 The Court found that the pur-
pose of the EC Treaty in the creation of a common market and the
purpose of the free trade agreement with Portugal in the creation of a
free trade area were sufficiently different that, "a prohibition on the
importation into the Community of a product originating in Portugal
based on the protection of copyright is justified in the framework of
the free-trade arrangements established by the Agreements by virtue
of the first sentence of Article 23" even "in a situation in which their
justification would not be possible within the Community."' 56 Thus,
identical language can have very different meaning when found in
agreements having similar, but distinguishable, purposes.
The European Court next faced the issue of direct effect of a
trade agreement in Pabst & Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg.
57
Tax rebates under the German spirits monopoly law, meant to temper
adjustments bringing that law into conformity with Community law,
were challenged as discriminatory and therefore in violation of Article
154 Id. at 347.
155 Id. at 348.
156 Id. at 349. Once again, important comparisons with both International Fruit and Bresciani,
not addressed in the Court's decision, were raised in the discussion by the Advocate General.
The Opinion of Advocate General Mrs. Roz6s distinguishes Bresciani by first noting a rejection
of a reciprocity analysis (i.e., the "imbalance" of obligations in the Yaound6 Convention). It
then notes that in the Yaound6 Convention, "the Member States had intended to assume the
same obligations towards the African States and Madagascar as they had assumed towards each
other and it was as a result of that reference that the Court was able to hold that the provision
conferred personal rights on individuals." Advocate General Roz~s found specific contrast with
the analysis of the GATI" in International Fruit, summarizing as follows:
By way of contrast to [International Fruit], the issue in this case is not whether, just as
Community law prevails in principle over national law, international commitments entered
into by the Community take precedence over the acts of its institutions (for example, a
regulation of the Council of Ministers), but whether commitments entered into by the Com-
munity with non-member countries must be regarded by the national courts as being of the
same nature and having the same scope as those entered into by the Member States inter se,
in other words whether the classical international legal order is identical to the Community
legal order. Everyday reality shows that that is unfortunately not so.
l at 355.
As such, Advocate General Roz6s' analysis (1) follows a dualist perspective of international
legal jurisprudence for the Community, (2) emphasizes the concept of primacy of Community
law first developed in Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425, and
(3) finds both of these conclusions to be "unfortunate." 1982 E.C.R. at 355.
157 Case 17/81, Pabst & Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 1982 E.C.R. 1331, [1983] 3
C.M.L.R. 11.
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53(1) of the Association Agreement between the Community and
Greece.-1 8 Relying in large part on its similarity to the language and
function of EC Treaty Article 95, the Court found Article 53 of the
Association Agreement to be directly effective,15 9 noting that the
wording of Article 53(1) is "similar to that of Article 95 of the [EEC]
Treaty, [and] fulfils ... the same function as that of Article 95. " 16°
After Pabst & Richarz, an attempt to draw useful conclusions
from the decisions of the European Court of Justice might reasonably
have led to the assumption that agreements directly tied to the EC
Treaty were capable of providing rules of direct effect, while less di-
rectly connected agreements were not. Thus, the Yaound6 Agree-
ment, institutionalizing arrangements favoring former colonies and
related countries and specifically provided for in the EC Treaty, was
the source of directly effective rules in Bresciani. Similarly, an associ-
ation agreement preparing a non-member country for membership in
the Community provided a directly effective rule in Pabst & Richarz.
On the other hand, a free trade agreement, as considered in Polydor,
was not capable of providing direct effect because its connection to
the constitutional framework of the EC Treaty was more tenuous.
Further, an agreement such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
158 "Neither Contracting Party shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of the
other Contracting Party any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or
indirectly on similar domestic products." The refunds were also challenged on the basis of Arti-
cle 95 of the EC Treaty in regard to raw spirit coming from France and Italy. 1982 E.C.R. at
1344.
159 This time the Commission had argued in favor of direct effectiveness of the provision. I.
at 1342.
160 Id. at 1350.
It accordingly follows from the wording of Article 53(1) ... and from the objective and
nature of the Association Agreement of which it forms part that that provision precludes a
national system of relief from providing more favourable tax treatment for domestic spirits
than for those imported from Greece. It contains a clear and precise obligation which is not
subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure. In
those circumstances Article 53(1) must be considered as directly applicable from the begin-
ning of the third year after the entry into force of the Agreement, on which date all meas-
ures conflicting with that provision was, [sic] by virtue of its third subparagraph, to be
abolished.
Accordingly... an importer of spirits from other Member States may rely before a national
court on the first subparagraph of Article 53(1) of the Association Agreement with Greece
against the application of national measures of tax relief for spirits,... if such measures
have the effect of according less favourable treatment to such spirits than to similar domes-
tic products."
Id. at 1350-51.
Advocate General Roz~s would have gone so far as to find that, from prior case law on
Article 95, "the reasons why the Court found that the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty
had direct effect apply mutatis mutandis to Article 53(1) of the Agreement signed in Athens with
Greece." Id. at 1359. Thus, a direct connection would have been made between the direct effect
of the EC Treaty itself (the constitutional law of the Community) and the direct effect of provi-
sions of treaties entered on behalf of the Community.
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Trade, to which the Community was not even officially a contracting
party and which has no direct tie to the constitutional framework of
the EC Treaty, was also incapable of having directly effective
provisions.
Such a rationale for the direct effects jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court in international agreements was proved useless in the 1983
case of Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg.'61 An importer of port
wine from Portugal challenged the German monopoly equalization
duty as being in violation of Article 95 of the EC Treaty and Article
21(1) of the free trade agreement between the Community and Portu-
gal. The Court held Article 21(1) of the free trade agreement directly
effective. Determining that agreements concluded under Article 228
of the EC Treaty are binding on the institutions of the Community
and on Member States, the Court found it "incumbent upon the Com-
munity institutions, as well as upon the Member States, to ensure
compliance with the obligations arising from such agreements."' 162
The logic of direct effect for the provisions of the free trade agreement
came from intra-Community law. Member State obligations arising
from agreements concluded by the Community institutions create not
only rights running to the non-member countries with whom the
agreement was negotiated but also to the Community itself "which
has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agree-
ment." 63 Thus, the free trade agreement with Portugal, through Arti-
cle 228 of the EC Treaty, was a directly effective, integral part of
Community law.
Not only did Kupferberg dispel the notion that the Court's direct
effects jurisprudence was based on the type of agreement involved,
but it also removed several other rationales for determining the direct
effect of provisions of agreements binding on the Community. The
decision hinged in large part on the necessity for uniformity in the
interpretation of Community law.64 In doing so, it specifically re-
jected as determinative factors in considering direct effect (1) the prin-
161 Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG, 1982 E.C.R. 3641,
[1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
162 Id. at 3662.
163 Id. at 3662.
164 The court stated:
It follows from the Community nature of such provisions that their effect in the Com-
munity may not be allowed to vary according to whether their application is in practice the
responsibility of the Community institutions or of the Member States ..... Therefore it is
for the Court, within the framework of its jurisdiction in interpreting the provisions of
agreements, to ensure their uniform application throughout the Community.
Id. at 3362-63.
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cipal of reciprocity; (2) the presence in the agreement of an
institutional framework for dispute settlement; and (3) the presence of
a safeguard clause in the agreement.
The Court rejected a reciprocity test that would find that a Com-
munity agreement may have a direct effect in the legal order of one
contracting party only when the other party recognizes such an effect:
According to the general rules of international law there must be bona
fide performance of every agreement. Although each contracting party
is responsible for executing fully the commitments which it has under-
taken it is nevertheless free to determine the legal means appropriate for
attaining that end in its legal system unless the agreement, interpreted in
the light of its subject-matter and purpose, itself specifies those means.
Subject to that reservation the fact that the courts of one of the parties
consider that certain of the stipulations in the agreement are of direct
application whereas the courts of the other party do not recognize such
direct application is not in itself such as to constitute a lack of reciprocity
in the implementation of the agreement.
165
As to the presence of a separate dispute settlement mechanism in
an agreement, the Court ruled that, "the mere fact that the con-
tracting parties have established a special institutional framework for
consultations and negotiations inter se in relation to the implementa-
tion of the agreement is not in itself sufficient to exclude all judicial
application of that agreement."'1 66 Further, on the issue of safeguard
clauses, the Court determined that such clauses "apply only in specific
circumstances" and "do not affect the provisions prohibiting tax dis-
crimination."' 67 Thus, the presence of provisions that had seemed so
important to the Court's finding of no direct effect in GATT cases
such as International Fruit, Schlater, and Diirbeck were no longer de-
terminative in the Court's analysis of the free trade agreement with
Portugal.
16
Like the analysis in International Fruit, the Kupferberg decision
addressed the entire agreement prior to consideration of the specific
provision claimed to be directly effective. As to the free trade agree-
ment with Portugal, as a whole, the Court found neither its nature nor
its structure to prevent a trader from reliance on its provisions before
a court within the Community.169 The Court then considered Article
165 Id. at 3663-64. Compare the position of the Commission in Polydor, supra note 149 and
accompanying text with the position of Advocate General Mrs. Rozds in Bresciani, supra note
156.
166 Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. at 3664.
167, Id.
168 Michel Waelbroeck, Effect of GATT Within the Legal Order of the EEC, 8 J. WoRLD
TRADE L 614, 617 (1974).
169 1982 E.C.R. at 3665.
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21 specifically, finding that it, "imposes . an unconditional rule
against discrimination in matters of taxation," and as such, "may be
applied by a court and thus produce direct effects throughout the
Community.'
170
The 1987 case of Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gmand171 further
eroded the notion that any differences between association agree-
ments and free trade agreements were useful in determining direct
effect status of their provisions. The Court found that provisions of
the Association Agreement with Turkey were not directly applicable
in a challenge to national measures. A Turkish national was ordered
expelled by decision of the German City of Schwabisch Gmtind as not
entitled to remain with her Turkish husband. The deportation was
challenged as contrary to prohibitions on restrictions on the free
movement of persons contained in Articles 7 and 12 of Association
Agreement with Turkey, combined with Article 36 of the Additional
Protocol.
The Demirel Court considered the Agreement generally as set-
ting out "aims" and "guidelines" as opposed to "detailed rules," find-
ing that, "[o]nly in respect of certain specific matters are detailed rules
laid down by the protocols annexed to the Agreement, later replaced
by the Additional Protocol.""17 At the same time, the decision im-
plied further erosion of the analysis employed in regard to the GATT
in International Fruit, by appearing to recognize that even though the
agreement, as such, may lack the characteristics of direct effect, some
"detailed rules" in the protocols may be entitled to direct effect. This
implication is furthered by the Court's more elaborate discussion of
specific provisions. In other words, unlike International Fruit, where
the Court stopped after finding that the agreement as such was inca-
pable of direct effects, here the Court went on to the specific provi-
sions. The subsequent analysis of specific provisions limits the extent
to which this gloss on International Fruit may be extended, however,
as the provisions considered by the Court were found to be "not suffi-
170 Id. It is important to note that, while acknowledging the possibility of finding directly
effective rules in the free trade agreement involved, the Kupferberg decision at the same time
distinguished those rules from similar directly effective rules arising from the EC Treaty. The
Court specifically noted the language differences between Article 21 of the EEC-Portugal Free
Trade Agreement and Article 95 of the EC Treaty, and the different purposes of the two treaties,
noting that "the interpretations given to Article 95 of the Treaty cannot be applied by way of
simple analogy to the Agreement on free trade." Id. at 3666. Further, the Court ultimately
found no discrimination within the prohibitions of Article 21 of the Free Trade Agreement.
Thus, while winning the decision on direct effect, the plaintiff lost the judgment.
171 Case 12186, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 421.
172 Id. at 3752.
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ciently precise and unconditional to be capable of governing directly
the movement of workers.' 1 73 However, the Court's extended in-
quiry, after first finding the agreement as a whole lacking in indicia of
direct effect, indicated an evolution beyond the more limited ap-
proach of International Fruit.
The Court has continued to find directly effective provisions in
bilateral trade agreements after Kupferberg and Demirel. In Sevince
v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie,74 direct applicability was acknowledged
for a decision of the Council of Association provided by the Associa-
tion Agreement with Thrkey. In ONEM v. Bahia Kziber,17 5 the Court
recognized the direct effect of the national treatment provisions of the
Co-operation Agreement between the EC and Morocco.1
76
D. The Direct Effects of International Agreement Provisions After
Kupferberg and Demirel
For an outsider, it is difficult to draw from the case law of the
European Court of Justice any clear tests applicable to direct effect
questions that might arise in future cases involving international
agreements of the Community. Pierre Pescatore, a former judge of
the European Court, has suggested that the analysis applied to the
GATT in International Fruit and Schlater in comparison to that ap-
plied to the Yaound6 Convention in Bresciani and the EEC/Portugal
Free Trade Agreement in Kupferberg, represent distinctly different
approaches to the same issue. 77 The GAT cases reflect a "context
approach" without analysis of the specific provisions alleged to have
direct effect. Discussion is restricted to "the general characteristics of
GAIT - which in short is described as a forum for commercial negoti-
ations rather than a set of binding rules."'1 78 The Bresciani and
Kupferberg cases, on the other hand, demonstrate a "textual ap-
proach," with "the question of direct applicability.., discussed on the
basis of individual provisions in given agreements.' 79 Pescatore finds
this analytical distinction problematic:
173 Id. at 3753.
174 Case C-192/89, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3461, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 57.
175 Case C-18/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-199.
176 See Fernando Castillo de la Torre, The Status of GATT in EEC Law: Some New Develop-
ments, 26 J. WoRLD TRADE 35, 35 n.1 (Oct. 1992).
177 Pierre Pescatore, Treaty-making by the European Communities, in THE EFFEcr OF TREA-
nnms IN DOMESTC LAW, 177, 184-88 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
178 Id at 186-87.
179 Id. at 187-88.
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A comparison of these two lines of approach shows that they lead to
contradictory results in so far as identical clauses... are said to confer
rights on individuals whenever the clauses are examined on their own
merits, whereas the same clauses may be said to be without effect for
individuals whenever an international instrument is approached in an
indiscriminate way without regard for individual clauses.
180
Noting that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties181 "suggests a progression from text to context and not the re-
verse,''182 Pescatore finds a need to reconcile these cases through the
consistent application of a textual approach to all international
agreements. 83
Despite the concerns raised by Pescatore, the distinction between
a textual and a contextual approach might be supportable if the Court
considers the nature of the agreement being addressed of overriding
importance. However, the Kupferberg analysis, finding directly effec-
tive rules in a free trade agreement, constitutes a rejection of distinc-
tions based solely on the type of agreement.
184
Other distinctions that might have carried weight after Interna-
tional Fruit similarly have been weakened or rejected by subsequent
decisions.185 Once a context analysis is discredited, reliance on the
preamble and the general flexibility of the General Agreement8 6 is
not possible in denying direct effect to a specific provision. Neither is
reliance on vagueness and ambiguity in derogation provisions or pro-
visions addressing the settlement of disputes sufficient to negate the
180 Id. at 187.
181 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980).
182 Pescatore, supra note 177, at 188.
183 The application of this method shows that international treaties and agreements contain
in varying proportions flexible elements and well-defined obligations. It may be true that
the latter are relatively more numerous in free trade agreements than in a system like
GAIT, but even here we find a certain number of precise commitments which by their
essence and in view of the purpose of the General Agreement are not negotiable, such as
the rule on non-discriminatory commercial treatment of imported goods, the prohibition of
using internal taxation for protective purposes, freedom of transit and the effect of consoli-
dated tariff concessions. In other words, those obligations, being precise and unconditional,
fulfil the criteria for direct applicability which the Court has consistently followed in many
other fields.
Id.
184 See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
185 For an exhaustive rejection of the possible criteria after International Fruit see Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
20 COMMON Mcar. L REv. 397 (1983).
186 Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1227 [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying
text.
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specificity of other provisions.'87 The Court ignored the presence of a
dispute settlement provision as justification for denying direct effect in
Bresciani88  and specifically rejected such an argument in
Kupferberg.189 The Kupferberg decision also rejected reliance on the
principle of reciprocity to deny direct effect to a provision of a Com-
munity agreement.190 Thus, the fact that another party to the agree-
ment might not allow private parties to assert rights derived from the
agreement in its courts should not prevent a finding of direct effect.' 9 '
Further, the Kupferberg decision eliminated the argument that safe-
guard clauses weaken other provisions of an agreement sufficiently to
deny them direct effect.'" 2 In essence, the Kupferberg judgment com-
pels the textual analysis propounded by Pescatore. The Demirel deci-
sion, by implying that an agreement lacking indicia of direct effects on
the whole may yet contain directly effective provisions, seems to make
an argument favoring a contextual approach even more difficult.
93
E. The Banana Cases: The Continuing Challenge
On February 13, 1993, the Council of Ministers, by qualified ma-
jority vote, adopted Regulation No. 404/93, establishing a common or-
ganization of the Community market in bananas.194 Prior to that
regulation, some Member States provided preferential outlets for ba-
nanas from ACP States while others had more liberal import rules,
thus preventing the free movement of bananas within the Community.
Regulation 404/93 was designed to replace this system with a single
market for bananas.195 Germany, which previously had benefited
from an arrangement allowing it to import an annual quota of bananas
free of customs duty, brought an action against the Council under Ar-
ticle 173 of the EC Treaty, seeking a declaration that the tariff quotas-
established by the regulation were void.'96
As part of its argument, Germany alleged that the regulation in-
fringed the GAT and was therefore unlawful regardless of the direct
187 But see Meinhard Hilf, The Application of GATT Within the Member States of the Euro-
pean Communit With Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany, in Ttm EUROPEAN
COMMUNrrY AND GATT 153, 176-77 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
188 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
191 Id
192 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
194 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1.
195 Case C-280193, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 5054-57.
196 Id.
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effect status of the GATT because "compliance with GAT rules is a
condition of the lawfulness of Community acts."'1 97 Both the Council
and the Commission argued that GAIT provisions cannot be asserted
in a challenge to Community legislation "except in the special case
where the Community provisions were adopted to implement obliga-
tions entered into within the framework of GAIT.'
'1 9 8
Repeating the oft-stated position that "the provisions of GAT
have the effect of binding the Community," '19 9 the Court refused to
waiver from its International Fruit analysis, even as applied to an Arti-
cle 173 challenge by a Member State.2 °° Once again, the Court reiter-
ated that GATr provisions cannot be directly applicable in
Community law because the GAT (1) is "based on the principle of
negotiations undertaken on the basis of 'reciprocal and mutually ad-
vantageous arrangements;"' (2) is too flexible in "conferring the pos-
sibility of derogation;" (3) is too flexible in "the measures to be taken
when confronted with exceptional difficulties;" and (4) is too flexible
in its provisions dealing with the settlement of conflicts between the
contracting parties.2 1
By simply parroting International Fruit, without any acknowledg-
ment of subsequent decisions considering international agreements
197 Id. at 1-5071.
198 Id. at 1-5071-72.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 1-5073.
201 These factors are from the summary of the Court in the International Fruit decision at
para. 21, which is quoted in the Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann at Case C-280/93, Ger-
many v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 1-5024, para. 139. The opinion of the Court elaborated on
this language as follows:
It is settled law that GATT, which according to its preamble is based on the principle of
negotiations undertaken on the basis of 'reciprocal and mutually hdvantageous arrange-
ments', is characterized by the great flexibility of its provisions, in particular those confer-
ring the possibility of derogation, the measures to be taken when confronted with
exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties.
The Court has recognized that those measures include, for the settlement of conflicts, de-
pending on the case, written recommendations or proposals which are to be 'given sympa-
thetic consideration', investigations possibly followed by recommendations, consultations
between or decisions of the contracting parties, including that of authorizing certain con-
tracting parties to suspend the application to any others of any obligations or concessions
under GATr and, finally, in the event of such suspension, the power of the party concerned
to withdraw from that agreement.
It has noted that where, by reason of an obligation assumed under GATT or of a concession
relating to a preference, some producers suffer or are threatened with serious damage, Arti-
cle XIX gives a contracting party power unilaterally to suspend the obligation and to with-
draw or modify the concession, either after consulting the contracting parties jointly and
failing agreement between the contracting parties concerned, or even, if the matter is urgent
and on a temporary basis, without prior consultation.
Id. at 1-5072-73 (citations omitted).
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other than the GATr, the Court clearly took the position that within
the Community, GAIT rules are, at best, "soft" law:
The special features noted above show that the GATT rules are not un-
conditional and that an obligation to recognize them as rules of interna-
tional law which are directly applicable in the domestic legal systems of
the contracting parties cannot be based on the spirit, general scheme or
terms of GATr.2 °2
Noting the special circumstances of Fediol and Nakaima,203 the
Court, first finding no directly applicable obligation flowing from the
GATT itself, states that "it is only if the Community intended to im-
plement a particular obligation entered into within the framework of
GATT, or if the Community act expressly refers to specific provisions
of GATIT, that the Court can review the lawfulness of the Community
act in question from the point of view of the GATT rules. ' ' °
Advocate General Gulmann's opinion was consistent with the
Court's decision but went further in noting the political and legal
quandary created by the result.20 5 In particular, he noted that the
Court's position, though "not... in itself an infringement of interna-
tional law," failed to "help secure respect for international obliga-
tions."2 6 His opinion raises no obstacle to the Court departing from
its position in International Fruit, noting that the effect of the GATT
in the Community legal order is not settled in the GATT itself, and is
thus, "a matter 'for decision by the courts having jurisdiction in the
matter, and in particular by the Court of Justice within the Framework
of its jurisdiction under the [EC] Treaty."' 20 7 The Advocate General's
position is summarized when he states:
It is thus established that the question of the effects of GATT within the
Community legal order is to be determined by the Court. That decision
is essential. It has great importance in principle and in practice. To ac-
cept the German Government's view would strengthen the impact of
GATr in the Community legal order and help to ensure the Community
institutions' respect for the agreement even if, where appropriate, the
202 Id at 1-5073.
203 Supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
204 1994 E.C.R. at 1-5073-74.
205 1994 E.C.R. at 1-4980 (Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann).
206 Id. at 1-5021:
[U]nless a contrary intention may be deduced from the agreement in question there is no
requirement for the judicial institutions of the internal legal systems to enforce international
commitments. Such legal enforcement is of course possible and will help to secure respect
for international obligations, but it will not be in itself an infringement of international law
if the contracting parties' legal systems do not contain rules giving the judicial institutions
jurisdiction for such enforcement.
207 Id. at 1-5022 (quoting from Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie.
KG, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.)
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Court were to restrict its review to cover more obvious infringements of
GATr. However, such an acceptance might also mean a perceptible
change in the possibilities for the competent institutions of the Commu-
nity to safeguard the Community's interests within the legal framework
laid down in GATT. In my view the Court should not come to a deci-
sion on the question at issue here without serious consideration of the
views expressed by the Council and the Conunission.
208
Thus, the Advocate General (1) raises concern about the role of the
direct effects doctrine in developing respect for international law;
(2) finds final authority on the question of direct effect to reside with
the Court; and (3) counsels substantial deference to the other princi-
pal institutions of the Community in exercising this authority.
Two aspects of Germany v. Council represent significant develop-
ments in the Court's direct effects jurisprudence and GATT obliga-
tions. First, direct effect was claimed by a Member State bringing the
case under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, rather than by a private party
in an action referred to the Court by a national court through the
Article 177 preliminary ruling process.2 °9 The Court found this dis-
tinction insufficient to require any divergence from the International
Fruit position.
Second, by the time the case was decided by the Court, the pref-
erential Community policy on banana imports already had been the
subject of formal dispute resolution proceedings in the GATT. The
pre-regulation restrictions on banana imports in France, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain and the U.K. were found inconsistent with the quantitative
restriction prohibitions of GATT Article XI and in violation of the
most-favored-nation requirements of Article I in a panel report
presented to the GATr Council at its meeting in June 1993.210 At the
same meeting, the Council established a panel to examine complaints
by five Latin American nations against the new Regulation 404/93 ba-
nana regime, which went into effect on July 1, 1993.211 The second
report was presented to the Council on March 23, 1994, and found
inconsistencies with the Community's Article II schedules of conces-
sions and violations of the most-favored-nation requirement of Article
208 1994 E.C.R. at 1-5022. See also U. Everling, Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas
Judgment of the Court of Justice and National Courts, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 401, 403
(1996)("The Bananas Judgment of the Court of Justice briefly and categorically rejected all argu-
ments based on the respect for international obligations and for vested rights of traders.").
209 Belgium and The Netherlands supported Germany's position. 1994 E.C.R. at 1-5051.
210 Russia applies for GATT membership: Panel rules against EC members' restrictions on
bananas, 100 GATT Focus, July 1993, at 2.
211 ld. at 4.
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I and the national treatment requirement of Article HI.212 Adoption
of both panel reports was blocked by the Community Member States
and the ACP states who are the recipients of the preferential regime.
Six days after the second panel report was presented to the
GATF Council, the parties to the banana dispute entered into a
"Framework Agreement," by which some states waived. further
GATT dispute settlement against the European Community, in ex-
change for an enlarged tariff quota and lower tariff for non-traditional
and third country banana imports.2 13 Implementation of the Frame-
work Agreement has been neither expeditious nor complete.214 Ger-
many instituted proceedings before the European Court challenging
the Agreement, but the Court found no need to respond to the re-
quest for an opinion under EC Treaty Article 228(6) because the
agreement became effective before the Court's decision.2
15
Proceedings from the Finanzgericht (Finance Court) Hamburg
present another angle on the direct effect challenge and the banana
regime.2 16 A German importer contracted in 1991 and 1993 to receive
weekly shipments of bananas from Ecuador until 1996. When the
quota system was introduced by Council Regulation 404/93, the
licenses available to the importer were no longer sufficient to cover all
the bananas contracted for. Thus, the importer was forced to sell in
third countries at lower prices and was faced with financial collapse.
The importer's financial situation further deteriorated as a result of
Commission Regulation 2478/95 of March 1, 1995, which is based on
Regulation 404/93 and further devalued the licenses for third country
bananas.
21 7
The Finanzgericht Hamburg found both regulations to be con-
trary to the GATT and, though valid under Community law per the
European Court's decision in Germany v. Council,218 not to be ap-
212 Panel report on EC banana import regime presented, 108 GATT Focus, June 1994, at 5.
Further proceedings were initiated under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding in 1996.
See WTO Dispute Panel Begins Hearing on EU Banana Regime Complaint by U.S., 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA)No. 36, at 1423 (Sept. 11, 1996).
213 Costa Rica - Columbia - Dominican Republic - European Community - Nicaragua - Vene-
zuela: Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, March 29, 1994, reprinted at 34 I.L.M. 1
(1995).
214 Everling, supra note 208.
215 Case C-3/94 Opinion on request by the Federal Republic of Germany for an opinion pursu-
ant to Article 228(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4579.
216 Case C-182/95, T. Port GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas Decision of the
Finanzgericht Hamburg of May 19, 1995, AZ: IV 119/95 H.
217 1995 OJ. (149) 1.
218 Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 5054-57.
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plied in Germany on constitutional grounds. The court determined
(1) that the Federal Republic of Germany, as a member of GATT, is
bound by the provisions of the GAIT; (2) that the Finanzgericht has
jurisdiction to review conflicts between the validity of Community
regulations and the Federal Republic's obligations under the GATT in
such proceedings for interim measures; (3) that Article 234 of the EC
Treaty gives GATF precedence over Community law which conflicts
with the GATT ;219 and (4) that the Community provisions in conflict
with the GATT are not to be applied in Germany.2 0 Based on these
determinations, the court issued an interim injunction requiring that a
license be issued to the importer,221 pending the submission to the
Court of Justice of questions including the relationship under Article
234 of Articles I, II and III of the GAIT to the two challenged regula-
tions. 22 On appeal to the Bundesflnanzhof, the injunction was sus-
pended.2a On November 26, 1996, the Court of Justice ruled that
national courts may not order interim relief against Community meas-
ures and that such relief is available only before the Court of Justice in
an action initiated by a Member State.224
Other references to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling
remain effective, however, as does the appeal of the
Bundesflnanzhof's decision to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court). In a second decision on a very similar set of
facts, the Finanzgericht Hamburg again suspended customs duties and
referred the matter for a preliminary ruling.225 Upon appeal to the
Bundesfinanzhof, this time the suspension of duties was not reversed
219 Article 234 1 reads as follows:
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into force of
this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third
countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.
TREATY ESTABLISHING r'Ti EUROPEAN CoMMuNrTY, art. 234, supra note 4. The European
Court has held elsewhere that an international agreement entered by a Member State prior to
the creation of the European Community may take precedence over Community legislation, at
least until the Member State exercises its obligation to bring its international obligations into
conformity with its Community obligations under Article 234. Case C-158/91, Ministdre Public
et Direction du travail et de 'emploi v. Levy, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4287.
220 Request for preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg, Case No. C-182195-1 at
14.
221 Id. at 1.
222 Ld. at 2.
223 Preliminary Ruling Request of the Finanzgericht Hamburg on its decision of May 19,
1995, translated for the European Court of Justice at Case C-182/95-1, June 12, 1995.
224 Case C-68/95, T. Port GmbH & Co. v. Bundesanstalt ftir Landwirtschaft und Ernlihrung,
as reported in FINANCIAL Timms, Dec. 3, 1996, at 16.
225 Preliminary Ruling Request of the Finanzgericht Hamburg on its decision of Aug. 29,
1995, translated for the European Court of Justice at Case C-364/95-1, Nov. 28, 1995.
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and has been allowed to stand, again subject to appeal to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht on German constitutional issues.2 2 6 Thus,
the question of direct effect and the banana regime is before the Court
of Justice on the initiative of both the German government and a Ger-
man importer. Given the Maastricht judgment of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht,22 7 the European Court's role in these cases remains
further complicated by the conclusion of the Finanzgericht Hamburg
that German officials are "prohibited from applying in Germany
Community law which has been adopted ultra vires." 22
F. Legal Rationales For and Against Direct Effect of GATT in
Community Law
To this observer, the case law of the European Court of Justice
creates confusion and uncertainty. The ambiguity with which the
Court criticized the GAIT in International Fruit, combined with the
Court's decisions finding directly effective provisions in other interna-
tional agreements of the Community, seem to leave European direct
effects jurisprudence at least as flexible as the GATT system it consid-
ers.229 In the GAIT system, this flexibility is seen as contributing to
the "soft" nature of legal rules, thereby rendering them incapable of
direct effect. The same analysis applied to the European Court's di-
rect effects jurisprudence concerning international agreements could
easily lead one to the conclusion that EC law on this issue is itself
every bit as "soft" as any part of the GAIT system. This leads further
to an incongruity that may best be resolved by European Court review
of both the position of the GAIT in EC law and the Court's own
discussion of direct effects as applied to international agreements.
The decision in Germany v. Council indicates, however, that the Court
is unwilling to take on this challenge.
Although it would be presumptuous for an outsider to suggest a
resolution of this incongruity, some observations are appropriate on
226 See Rechtmrufligkeit des "Bananen"-Zolls zweifelhaft, Nationale Gerichte, 2/96 EWS at 49.
227 Federal Constitutional Court Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty of Oct. 12, 1993,
translated in 33 I.L.M. 388 (1994).
228 Preliminary Ruling Request of the Finanzgericht Hamburg in Case C-364/95-1, supra note
225, at 3. The European Court of Justice extended its decision in Germany v. Council, when it
ruled that the Banana Regulation (No. 404/93) did not breach "essential procedural require-
ments" or the importers' right to property. Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft
mbH v. Bundesamt ftr Ernhrung und Forstwirtschaft, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3781.
229 To one commentator, the issue of flexibility goes not to direct effects, but to the initial
question of whether the agreement is binding at all. H.G. Schermers, Community Law and In-
ternational Law, 12 COMMON Micr. L. REv. 77, 81 (1975). Thus, if the agreement is binding,
flexibility is no longer an argument against its provisions having direct effect.
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why it is troublesome. In making such observations, it is not difficult
to determine where to begin. International Fruit is the consensus
choice as the starting point. It is more difficult, however, to know just
where to go from International Fruit. This is in part because the Euro-
pean Court has - consistently without elaboration - bound itself ever
more tightly to the no-direct-effects position of International Fruit in
subsequent GATT cases, while at the same time discussing other in-
ternational agreements in language that only weakens the rationales
stated or implied in International Fruit. In the commentary, this has
resulted in a list of suggested rationales so long and sometimes so
ephemeral that the debate often takes on the quixotic nature of wind-
mill jousting.
Certain distinctions fail because they are illogical or inappropri-
ate in a modem legal system. For example, despite the deference rec-
ommended by Advocate General Gulmann in Germany v. Council,"30
the position of the Commission before the Court of Justice should not
control the outcome. The Commission negotiates, but does not con-
clude, international agreements.23 1 Giving it complete deference in
the interpretation of such agreements would be an inappropriate dele-
gation of judicial duties to the executive branch.
Neither should the Court's direct effects jurisprudence be con-
trolled by a distinction based on whether it is a Community or a Mem-
ber State measure that is being challenged. The only cases in which a
measure has been found violative of a directly effective international
agreement have been challenges to Member State measures, 23 2 and no
challenge to a Community measure has been successful in demonstrat-
ing direct effect.2 33 However, the consensus position is that interna-
tional agreements hold a position in Community law that, while below
that of the EC Treaty itself, is superior to secondary Community legis-
230 See 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 1-5022.
231 Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 4, art. 228.
232 See, ag., Case 87/75, Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanza, 1976 E.C.R.
129, 2 C.M.L.R. 62; Case 17/81, Pabst & Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 1982 E.C.R.
1331, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 11; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG.a.A. 1982
E.C.R. 3641, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 1..
233 See, e.g., Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1; Case 9/73, Schltter v. Hauptzollamt
Lorrach, 1973 E.C.R. 1135; Case 38/75, Case 38/75, Douaneagent der Nederlandse Spoorwegen
NV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1975 E.C.R. 1149, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 167;
Case 112/80, Case 112/80, Firma Anton Dtlrbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt con Main-
Flughafen, 1981 E.C.R. 1095; and Caie 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd.,
1982 E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 677.
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lation as well as national law.234 Thus, whether the measure chal-
lenged is that of the Community or a Member State'should not be the
decisive factor.
Other distinctions have been shown to be inappropriate in the
above discussion. The type of agreement does not control the direct
effect decision. 3 5  Neither does the concept of reciprocity.
Kupferberg specifically rejected the argument that the position of
other parties to the international agreement should influence its status
in the Community.3 6 While international law may require reciprocity
in granting direct effect where such is the clear intention of the parties
from the inception of an agreement, it does not require it where such
an intention is not clear, and the fact that one party may not grant
direct effect does not prevent another from doing so.
237
234 See, ag., Karl Meesen, The Application of Rules of Public International Law within Com-
munity Law, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 485,500 (1976). See also Case C-61/94, Commission v.
Germany (Sept. 10, 1996) ("the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Commu-
nity over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far
as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements").
235 See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. See also Bebr, supra note 94, at 63
("Kupferberg suggests that neither the legal nature of an agreement nor the intensity of its link
with the Community are relevant for the direct effect of an agreement."); Maresceau, supra note
132, at 124-25 ("It remains difficult without more precise indications of the Court to explain why
direct effect is on principle refused to GATr while in Kupferberg a completely opposite stand
was taken in relation to trade agreements concluded between the Community and third
States."); Pescatore, supra note 177, at 186 ("international treaties and agreements contain in
varying proportions flexible elements and well-defined obligations. It may be true that the latter
are relatively more numerous in free trade agreements than in a system like GATT, but even
here we find a certain number of precise commitments which by their essence and in view of the
purpose of the General Agreement are not negotiable, such as the rule on nondiscriminatory
commercial treatment of imported goods, the prohibition of using internal taxation for protec-
tive purposes, freedom of transit and the effect of consolidated tariff concessions. In other
words, those obligations, being precise and unconditional, fulfil the criteria for direct applicabil-
ity which the Court has consistently followed in many other fields."). But see Ulrich Everling,
The Law of External Economic Relations of the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN CONI-
MUNrrY AND GATT 85 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds, 1986) ("it should be pointed out that impor-
tance should be attributed to the structure of the agreement. In considering whether an
agreement has direct effect, should account not be taken of its proximity to the Community and
its aims? In the judgment in Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shops, the difference between the
Community, which has integration as its object, and a free trade area is stressed. Is not also the
further distinction between a free trade area and the world-wide regulation of trade of
importance?").
236 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. See also Bebr, supra note 94, at 71;
Petersmann, supra note 185, at 429.
237 Edmond L. M. Vd1ker, The Direct Effect of International Agreements in the Community's
Legal Order, 1983 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 131, 137.
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The presence or absence of a dispute settlement system in the
agreement does not control the direct effects analysis.238 Similarly,
the presence of a safeguard clause in the agreement will not prevent
direct effect for other of its provisions. 239 Nor is a comparison of spe-
cific language in an international agreement with directly effective
language of the European Community Treaty decisive.24 Finally,
Germany v. Council made clear that neither the EC Treaty Article
under which the action is brought before the Court, nor the fact that
the party bringing the action is a Member State rather than an individ-
ual, would be sufficient distinguishing factors to determine the
result.24 1
If distinguishing legal criteria are to determine the direct effect of
provisions of a given international agreement, only two possible crite-
238 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. See also Bebr, supra note 94, at 61; Hilf,
supra note 187, at 179 ("The GATr dispute settlement procedures could support the direct ap-
plicability of GATr law as they are more effectively organized than those found in agreements
that have been declared directly applicable by the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties."); Petersmann, supra note 185, at 432 ("GATT's dispute settlement procedures under Arti-
cle XXIII have often been recommended as a model and have amply proven their effectiveness
in the approximately 75 complaints which have been lodged by GATT contracting parties under
Article XXIII GATr ... It is therefore surprising that the Court invokes Article XXIII, L., an
effective legal instrument for the maintenance of rule of law in international trade, as a justifica-
tion for it own refusal to control observance of GATT obligations by the Community and its
Member States in legal proceedings instituted by private parties."). But see Maresceau, supra
note 132, at 122 ("The putting into motion of the GATT mechanism of dispute settlement seems
indeed more to amplify the tendency towards non-direct effect of GATT. The GATT dispute
settlement procedure as it has further been worked out in the Understanding regarding notifica-
tion, consultation, dispute settlement and surveillance (28 Nov. 1979) and in the Ministerial Decla-
ration of 29 Nov. 1982 with its strong emphasis on conciliation and consensus has not enhanced
the arguments in favour of direct effect. One comes, therefore, to the somewhat paradoxical
situation that to a large degree the elaborated dispute settlement procedure of GATT also con-
stitutes one of the obstacles to its direct effect.").
239 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. See also Waelbroeck, supra note 168, at 617
("No international treaty imposes unconditional obligations. ... Even the EEC Treaty autho-
rizes, in certain cases, the unilateral adoption by Member States of safeguard measures. ... [As
to the EEC Treaty and GATI,] there is only a difference in degree, and not in substance, be-
tween the two.").
240 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. See also Bebr, supra note 94, at 67-68. But see
Petersmann, supra note 185, at 435 ("If treaties are binding upon the Community under interna-
tional law and contain "precise, complete and unconditional" provisions, which are "self-execut-
ing" according to the rules of interpretation of international law and capable of being directly
applied by domestic courts, Community Law requires their direct application by the Court of
Justice which must ensure their uniform application in the entire Community."); Waelbroeck,
supra note 168, at 617 ("According to domestic practice, the direct effects of a provision of an
international treaty presuppose that the obligation imposed upon the State is clear, complete
and unconditional. However, the importance of this condition must not be exaggerated. The
courts do not consider that it is necessary that the provision in question be absolutely incapable
of any derogation.").
241 See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
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ria remain from the language of the European Court's decisions:
(1) policy grounds for judicial abstention, and (2) promotion of uni-
form interpretation of Community law. The Court, however, clearly
did not rely on either of these grounds in its most recent decision
(Germany v. Council), but rather, simply followed International Fruit
without clear elaboration.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DIRECT EFFECTS DEBATE
Germany v. Council represents a clear policy choice by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in the face of what now appear to be difficult
legal arguments. It has been aptly stated that the Court "pushes the
supranational nature of EC law to its limits, since Member States,
which are formally GATT Members but, cannot participate in GATT
dispute settlement proceedings..., cannot invoke GATE provisions
before the Court of Justice either. '24 2 The fact that Member States
(unlike private individuals) are subjects of international rights and du-
ties, adds a constitutional dimension to the decision.24 3 By holding
that Member States may not assert rights arising out of the interna-
tional agreements to which they are parties, the Court further rein-
forces the transfer of authority from the Member States to the
Community institutions.
The policy choice made by the court is likely to face a further test
when, unlike the banana case,' a case follows a panel decision under
the new dispute settlement rules of the World Trade Organization.
Whereas GATT? Council adoption of the panel reports in the banana
case was blocked by the Community and its Member States, that pos-
sibility no longer exists. Thus, a panel (or Appellate Body) decision
against the Community in a new dispute will result in a decision the
Court cannot as easily dismiss. If GAT law is indeed binding on the
Community and the Member States,245 then a formal, adopted deci-
sion of the Dispute Settlement Body will be difficult to reject "without
undermining the authority of the whole dispute settlement
procedure. ' '2
46
242 Fernando Castillo de la Torre, The Status of GATT in EC Law, Revisited. The Conse-
quences of the Judgment on the Banana Import Regime for the Enforcement of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1995, at 53, 58 (Feb. 1995).
243 Ld. at 59.
244 See supra notes 194 to 228.
245 Joined Cases 21 to 2472, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1226, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1.
246 Castillo de la Torre, supra note 242, at 64.
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The result of Germany v. Council is, as a matter of policy, consis-
tent with the traditional European position that the GATT system,
and its rules are matters for the policy-making institutions of the Com-
munity and not for the Court.2 47 European officials and commenta-
tors rather consistently have opted for a negotiation-oriented
approach to the GATT, over the adjudication-oriented approach
often favored by U.S. commentators.248 The Council Directive imple-
menting the Uruguay Round agreements specifically states that "by its
nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, in-
cluding the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly in-
voked in Community or Member State courts. '249 This rejection of
direct effect in favor of a negotiation-orientation, however, presents
problems when one attempts to reconcile it with the expanded and
much-hardened rules resulting from the Uruguay Round. The Court's
analysis in International Fruit at least implies that "hard law" is to be
given direct effect. One thus has to question whether the International
Fruit result necessarily holds for the agreements resulting from the
Uruguay Round and its substantial evolution of the rules of the multi-
lateral trading system. The rule-oriented adjudication model em-
braced in the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Understanding
alone indicates a clear choice over the alternative power-oriented ne-
gotiation model. 5 °
247 But see the opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, stating that the ultimate decision on
direct effect is for the Court, giving weight to the positions of the other institutions. Supra note
208.
248 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Competing Philosophies of GATT Dispute Resolution in the
Oilseeds Case and the Draft Understanding on Dispute Settlement, 27 J. WoRLD TRADE, Dec.
1993, at 117, 120-22.
249 Council Decision 94/800/EC, 1994 OJ. (L 336) 1, 2. The Commission originally recom-
mended even more limiting language: "whereas these are intergovernmental agreements and it
is therefore necessary to ensure that they cannot be directly invoked in Member State or Com-
munity courts by private individuals who are national or legal persons." Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, COM(94)414, final, quoted in Castillo de la Torre, supra note
242, at 65. A reciprocity argument was presented in favor of such language:
It is already known that the United States and many other of our trading partners will
explicitly rule out any such direct effect. Without an express stipulation of such exclusion in
the Community instrument of adoption, a major imbalance would arise in the actual man-
agement of the obligations of the Community and other countries.
Canada took a similar, but much clearer, position in its implementing legislation: "No per-
son has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken, without the consent of
the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed
or arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement." World Trade Organization Agreement
Implementation Act of Dec. 15, 1994 ch. 47 § 6, 1994 S.C. 3 (Can.).
250 Professor Jackson has developed the distinction between "power-oriented" and "rule-ori-
ented" diplomacy. See, eg., John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International
Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 Micn. L. REv. 1570,1571-
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According to Professor Jackson, prudence dictates that political
officials avoid systems in which direct effect is granted to international
rules, particularly in systems where those rules achieve higher status
than municipal legislation.25 1 Thus, in the European Community for
example, where primacy accompanies direct effect,2 52 he finds signifi-
cant danger in granting direct effect to treaty rules. The policy argu-
ments against such direct effect (Jackson refers to it as "Direct
Applicability Higher Status" or DAHS) include:
(1) the "democratic deficit:" Treaties generally are negotiated by a few
persons in a representative capacity, and do not (particularly in states
like the United States) result from the same democratic process as do-
mestic legislation.
(2) inflexibility: Treaty rules (particularly if negotiated in a multilateral
context in which amendment is difficult) place rigid constraints on the
ability of national legal systems in responding to the needs of their citi-
zens by requiring that they act and legislate only in a manner consistent
with those treaty rules.
(3) "inhibition on future treaty making:" The fear that treaties will tie
the hands of national legislatures will tend to constrain governments
from entering into treaties as a general rule.
253
Jackson does note, however, that some circumstances weigh in favor
of DAHS, including (1) situations in which national officials and citi-
zens are worried about weak domestic structures and find that DAHS
provides external insurance that human rights and market economic
mechanisms will be respected, and (2) national systems in which the
courts and officials are allowed to ameliorate the problems of direct
effect.
The U.S. system, with its well-developed later-in-time rule,
25 4
provides some of the amelioration of which Jackson writes. Even so,
U.S. politicians have not left the matter to the courts, but rather, have
enacted statutory prohibitions on the direct effect of GAIT provi-
sions.25 5 Thus, the landscape remains dictated more by political con-
cerns than any desire for coherence in international legal structures.
Jackson's reluctance to embrace direct effect draws strength in
that, by removing inhibitions to entering treaties generally, states are
72 (1984); John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 .
WORLD TRADE L., Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 93, 98-101.
251 Jackson, Status of Legal Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, supra note
33, at 340.
252 Supra note 95 and accompanying text.
253 Jackson, Status of Legal Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, supra note
33, at 315-16, 326, 330-34, 338.
254 Supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
255 Supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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encouraged to enter agreements, thus promoting the development of
international norms through the treaty process. At the same time,
however, it risks the creation of treaties having little or no real impact.
Carried to the extreme, the complete absence of direct effect would
result in more treaties with no one having the need or incentive to
abide by any of them.
On the other side, a complete direct effect with primacy system
(DAHS in Jackson's terms) risks the possibility that few, if any, new
rules will be developed through the treaty process or that states will
enter treaties while specifically denying direct effect in their imple-
mentation. States will be unwilling to bind themselves inflexibly to
rules that cannot be adjusted to meet domestic needs in the future.
Ultimately, the need is for balance. Direct effect has its value. It
is through the observance and application of international law that its
effectiveness is enhanced. If what we call international law has no real
effect on people's lives, then its value is substantially diminished. If it
has real effect on people's lives, but those people have no access to its
application, this also diminishes its value.
A June 1995 Internet discussion on the list server of the Interna-
tional Economic Law Interest Group of the American Society of In-
ternational Law provides a glimpse of the views on direct effect, as
well as the seeming bipolar problem its choices present.25 6 Excerpts
from that discussion include the following:
Amy Porges: Viewed statically, direct effect is a nice thing, but viewed
dynamically, if all national systems "constitutionalized" trade via direct
effect the most likely result would be that any further progress interna-
tionally would become suddenly much more difficult, and international
decisionmaking would become much stickier and more politicized.
Joel Trachtman: As Weiler and Porges point out, there is a tradeoff be-
tween direct effect on the one hand, and willingness to legislate on the
other hand. This is a corollary of the principle that hard law is not neces-
sarily good law. However, while direct effect is not necessarily good, it is
also not necessarily bad. While we may not be ready to constitutionalize
trade law, we might be ready to "legislationalize" it, at least to some
extent, someday.
Werner Meng: Is effectiveness in foreign policy always a convincing ar-
gument against private positions? Why can exporters not claim a free-
dom by law? Why should states be free to violate international law
without any consequence in national law? Why is the eagerness to retain
the bargaining chip available (opening markets) so important that indi-
vidual rights are not effectively granted nor protected on the side of the
exporters. You know about the answer of "Constitutional Economics:"
256 The Internet address of the list server is asilielg@cali.kentlaw.edu.
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because the lobbies of industries competing with imports are stronger
than that of the exporters and because the body politic wants to be free
to cater to their needs if necessary.
Even if one does not accept that explanation everybody knows that in
the international trade area the individual is not considered as being a
subject but rather as an object of foreign policy. Lawyers should chal-
lenge this attitude.
257
Direct effect also can enhance multiple party compliance with the
terms of a treaty by generating predictability in its application.
258 If
courts and decision-makers in one state know the courts of another
state are likely to grant direct effect to the terms of a treaty between
the two states, then those courts and decision-makers can be more
comfortable in their own application of the same treaty provisions.
This of course raises the opposing reciprocity argument: a municipal
legal system should not grant direct effect to treaty provisions when it
is possible that treaty partners may not do the same. To do so would
place its own citizens and government at the disadvantage of having
the rules applied against them at home and yet not being available for
application abroad. As noted earlier, the European Court of Justice
has specifically rejected the negative reciprocity argument as being in-
appropriate in the modem international legal order.25 9
As Jackson notes, direct effect also tends to protect the rights of
individuals, particularly in human rights and market economy enhanc-
ing treaties. Thus, the growing relationship between individuals and
international law will have limited significance absent some level of
direct effect in domestic legal systems. The initial challenge is to de-
termine whether the choice is simply between the polar extremes of
direct effect with primacy (Jackson's DAHS) and no direct effect, or
whether some compromise solution is possible. The ongoing debate
indicates the problems (and benefits) of each extreme. The desire to
have both (1) flexibility for states in their relations with their subjects
and with other states, and (2) predictability and effectiveness of inter-
national rules which, once agreed-upon, will be applied to (and on
behalf of) all those whom they affect, creates tensions not easily
resolved.
257 Internet list server discussion of June 15 and 25, 1995 (Copy on file with the author).
258 In Jackson's words, "disrespect for international law is increased when international
norms are not effective." Jackson, Status of Legal Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, supra note 33, at 323.
259 Supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
One of the most important and challenging issues in international
law is the manner in which we address the relationship between the
individual and the international legal system.2 60 The traditional
framework, in which we set a "sovereign" government between the
individual and the development and application of the rules, is no
longer sufficient in all circumstances.261 The governmental duty to
provide citizen security can no longer be defined solely in reference to
feudal concepts. The economic and technological interdependence of
people requires fresh approaches to the way in which we view the
development of the legal framework, that allows us to live together
globally. The fact that governments feel insecure or threatened by the
application of international legal rules to them is not sufficient reason
to preclude that development. The purpose of government is not to
perpetuate traditional power structures, it is to provide security and
economic development for its citizens. If that security and develop-
ment can be provided better through the application of global rules -
particularly if doing so can lead to a strengthening of the global legal
framework - then the institutions of government should welcome the
application of those rules.
The concept of direct effect of international economic law carries
great significance in the development of the relationship between the
individual and international law. Governmental institutions cannot ig-
nore the importance of this concept to the developing global legal
framework. The European Community has provided a laboratory in
which the direct effects doctrine can be studied and debated.262 The
supranational model created for the application of Community law
within its Member States provides much to be emulated in the global
system. While the global system is not yet ready for the wholesale
application of these developments, it is important that we realize the
need to move in a similar direction. Not doing so will, at best, cause
the legal framework to lag behind economic and political develop-
ments and, at worst, lead to a complete failure to deal with changing
relationships "in the international system.
260 See Ronald A. Brand, Semantic Distinctions in an Age of Legal Convergence, 17 U. PENN.
J. INT'L ECONoMIc L. 3 (1996).
261 See Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FoRnaH INT'L L.J.
1685 (1995).
262 Professor Weiler lists the doctrine of direct effect and the doctrine of supremacy as the
first of four legal doctrines "that fixed the relationship between Community law and Member
State Law" in Europe. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,2413
(1991).
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